The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer by Murphy, Daniel T.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1985
The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer
Daniel T. Murphy
University of Richmond, dmurphy@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel T. Murphy, The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 67 (1985)
THE NEW VIRGINIA STOCK CORPORATION ACT: A 
PRIMER 
Daniel T. Murphy* 
THE NEw VmGINIA STOCK CoRPORATION AcT: A PRIMER 
I. Introduction ..................................... 
II. Analysis of the Revised Statute ................... 
A. Article One - General Provisions 
(VA. ConE ANN. §§ 13.1-601 to -614 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) ...................................... 
B. Article Two - Fees 
(VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-615 to -617 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) ...................................... 
c. Article Three - Formation of Corporations 
(VA. ConE ANN. §§ 13.1-618 to -625 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) ....................................... 
D. Article Four - Purposes and Powers 
(VA. ConE ANN. §§ 13.1-626 to -629 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) ...................................... 
E. Article Five - Name; Article Six - Office and 
Agent (VA. ConE ANN. §§ 13.1-630 to -637 (Repl. 
Vol. 1985)) .................................. 
F. Article Seven - Shares and Distributions 
(VA. ConE ANN. §§ 13.1-638 to -653 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) ...................................... 
G. Article Eight - Shareholders 
(VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-654 to -672 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) ...................................... 
H. Article Nine - Directors and Officers 
68 
71 
71 
72 
72 
74 
75 
76 
85 
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, UniversitY of Rich-
mond; A.B., 1965, Villanova University; J.D., 1968, Villanova University; LL.M., 1969, Co-
lumbia University. 
Mr. Murphy served as the Reporter for the Joint Bar Committee of the Virginia Bar 
Association and the Virginia State Bar which reviewed the new Virginia Stock Corporation 
Act in draft form and prepared Commentary on it. 
67 
68 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:67 
(VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-673 to -695 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
I. Article Ten - Indemnification 
(VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-696 to -704 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 
J. Article Eleven - Amendment of Articles of 
Incorporation and Bylaws (VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 
13.1-705 to -715 (Repl. Vol. 1985)). . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 
K. Article Twelve - Merger and Share Exchange 
(VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-716 to -722 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 
L. Article Thirteen - Sale of Assets 
(VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-723 to -724 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) . . . .. . . . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. . . . 123 
M. Article Fourteen - Affiliated Transactions 
(VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -728 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 
N. Article Fifteen- Dissenters' Rights 
(VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-729 to -741 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 
0. Article Sixteen - Dissolution 
(VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-742 to -756 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 
P. Article Seventeen - Foreign Corporations 
(VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-757 to -769 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 
Q. Article Eighteen - Records and Reports 
(VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-770 to -775 (Repl. Vol. 
1985)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 
R. Article Nineteen - Proceeding for Determination 
of Shareholders (VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-776 to 
-777 (Repl. Vol. 1985)) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 135 
S. Article Twenty - Transition Proceedings (VA. 
CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-778 to -800 (Repl. Vol. 1985)) 136 
III. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During its 1985 session, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a 
new stock corporation statute for Virginia1 ("Revised Statute"). 
1. Virginia Stock Corporation Act, 1985 Va. Acts 868 (codified at VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 13.1-
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The new statute became effective January 1, 1986.2 The Revised 
Statute represents a complete revision of the Virginia corporation 
statute and is the result of a thorough review of prior law. This 
article will discuss some of the significant changes in Virginia cor-
porate law effected by the Revised Statute and will offer some 
guidelines for the interpretation and application of its provisions.3 
601 to -800 (Repl. Vol. 1985)) [hereinafter cited as REVISED STATUTE]. 
A new non-stock corporation statute, VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 13.1-801 to -980 (Repl. Vol. 1985), 
was enacted at the same time and parallels the Revised Statute. Certain amendments to the 
corporate fee and tax structure contained in title 58.1 of the Code were necessitated by the 
Revised Statute. 
In 1983, the General Assembly directed the Virginia Code Commission ("Code Commis-
sion") to study chapters 1 and 2 of title 13.1 of the Code of Virginia, the then existing Stock 
Corporation and Non-Stock Corporation Acts, for the purpose of proposing significant revi-
sions to those statutes. H.J. Res. 3, 1983 Va. Acts 1243. This study was prompted by revi-
sions to the Model Act which had recently been approved or were pending and by the fact 
that a complete review of the Virginia statutes was thought to be due. 
As a part of this study, an initial draft of the Revised Statute was prepared by Allen C. 
Goolsby, III, Esq. in 1983 at the Code Commission's request. In late 1983 and the first half 
of 1984, a joint committee of the Virginia State Bar and the Virginia Bar Association re-
viewed and commented on Mr. Goolsby's draft. Mr. Goolsby revised his draft to take into 
account some of the Joint Committee's concerns and the then still unfolding Model Act. He 
submitted his final draft statute to the Code Commission in June, 1984. A set of comments 
prepared by the Joint Committee was submitted to the Code Commission in July, 1984. 
During the fall of 1984, the Code Commission reviewed, and held a series of hearings on, 
the draft statute. In January, 1985, the Code Commission submitted to the Governor and 
General Assembly its report on the review of the Stock Corporation Act, the Non-Stock 
Corporation Act and the fee and tax amendments. In this report, the Code Commission 
recommended that the revisions to these statutes as contained in the report be enacted. VA. 
CoDE Col>tM'N, REPoRT ON THE REVISION OF CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 OF TITLE 13.1 OF THE CoDE OF 
VmGINIA, H. Doc. No. 13 (1985) [hereinafter cited as CoDE CoMMISSION REPORT]. 
Appendix 1 to the Code Commission Report contains the text of the proposed revised 
stock corporation and non-stock corporation statutes. Appendix 3 contains the proposed 
amendments to title 58.1. The comments of the Joint Committee on the proposed revised 
stock corporation statute are contained as Appendix 4 to the Code Commission Report. The 
text of the Revised Statute is virtually the same as that contained in Appendix 1 to the 
Code Commission Report, the adoption of which the Code Commission recommended. 
The Revised Statute is not merely an extensive set of amendments to the prior statute, 
Virginia Stock Corporation Act, VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 13.1-1 to -200 (Repl. Vol. 1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as OLD STATUTE]. Instead, the Old Statute was repealed in its entirety upon the 
effective date of the Revised Statute. 
2. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, article 14, "Affiliated Transactions," became effective 
July 1, 1985. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-725 to -728. 
3. This article will not discuss every change made by the Revised Statute. And because of 
the short period of time that has elapsed since the statute's passage, this article will not be 
as thorough a scholarly exegesis as has been produced with respect to some other corpora-
tion statutes. See, e.g., E. FoLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CoRPORATION LAw (1972); Folk, 
Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law, The Robinson Treatise Reviewed and 
Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.CL. REv. 768 (1965). 
The statute as set out in Appendix 1 to the CoDE CoMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 1, 
contains a very helpful statement after each section, noting some of the differences between 
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The Revised Statute embodies most of the provisions of the Re-
vised Model Business Corporation Act4 ("Model Act"), which had 
been undergoing a thorough revision over the last several years. In 
fact, the desire to conform the Virginia statute to the most recent 
version of the Model Act was perhaps the most important motive 
prompting enactment of the Revised Statute. 
Other purposes are evident in the Revised Statute. For example, 
certain provisions have been drafted to protect Virginia corpora-
tions from hostile takeovers. Also, while there is no separate op-
tional chapter for closely held corporations as in some jurisdic-
tions, 15 some provisions of the Revised Statute evidence a 
recognition of the special problems of small, closely held 
corporations. 
In general, the Revised Statute adopts the Model Act's ap-
proach, except in those instances where prior Virginia law6 was 
thought to be more advantageous or where difficulty with the lan-
guage or effect of the Model Act's position was perceived. With 
several extremely important exceptions, the Revised Statute 
closely follows either the Model Act or prior Virginia law. 
Since the Revised Statute is largely an adaptation of the Model 
Act, Virginia, in enacting it, has become one of the first states to 
adopt the most recent version of the Model Act. 7 The advantages 
the proposed provision and the then existing comparable Virginia Code provision, and the 
relationship between it and the comparable Mod&! Act provision. 
4. REVISED MoDEL BusiNESS CoRP. A~ (1985) [hereinafter cited as MoDEL A~]. The 
Model Act had been under revision for quite some time. Revisions to certain provisions had 
been approved during the last few years. See, e.g., infra notes 43 & 157. A draft of the 
revised Model Act, including those portions previously approved, was circulated for com-
ment in 1983. See MODEL A~ (Exposure Draft 1983) [hereinafter cited as EXPOSURE 
DRAFT]. 
5. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 158 (West 1977); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1974); 
Mo. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CoDE ANN. §§ 4-101 to -603 (Repl. Vol. 1985). 
6. Throughout this article, the term "prior Virginia law" refers to the Virginia Stock Cor-
poration Act as it exited until January 1, 1986, OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-1 to -200, 
and the case law. 
7. Virginia thus carries on a tradition of being among the first states to conform its stat-
ute to the Model Act. Virginia's Stock Corporation Act was extensively revised in 1956 to 
conform to the early versions of the Model Act. See Emerson, Vital Weaknesses in the New 
Virginia Stock Corporation Act and the Model Act, 42 VA. L. REv. 489 (1956); Gibson, The 
Virginia Corporation Law of 1956, 42 VA. L. REV. 445, 603 (1956). In the intervening 30 
years, the Virginia statute has been amended piecemeal to reflect some of the revisions to 
the Model Act. It has been ten years since major changes have been made to the statute. In 
1975 some significant amendments were introduced which updated and conformed the stat-
ute to the Model Act. 
For an analysis and discussion of the older versions of the Model Act, see the authorities 
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of following a national model are obvious. The provisions have 
been thoroughly considered by a number of very prominent practi-
tioners and scholars. The Official Comments to each section of the 
Model Act should serve as a guide to the interpretation of the Re-
vised Statute's provisions. 8 The evolving case law from jurisdic-
tions having substantially the same provisions can be persuasive 
authority in the interpretation and application of the Revised 
Statute.9 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE REVISED STATUTE 
Functionally, the Revised Statute is divided into twenty articles. 
The corpus of statutory material contained in the thirteen articles 
comprising the former statute10 ("Old Statute") has been some-
what subdivided and rearranged within these twenty articles. 
A. Article One-General Provisions11 
Article One includes expanded definitional sections.12 In addi-
tion it contains provisions regarding notice and filing of documents 
with the State Corporation Commission ("Commission"). The re-
quirement for local filing of certificates issued by the Commission 
has been retained in Revised Statute section 13.1-605. 
One extremely helpful change is the provision for deferred effec-
tive dates in Revised Statute section 13.1-606(A). Normally, the ef-
fective date of a certificate issued by the Commission is the date of 
the certificate. Prior law and practice proved rather inflexible on 
cited in Murphy, Redemption of Stock Under the Model Business Corporation Act and the 
Virginia Stock Corporation Act, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 311, 311 n.1, 316 n.10, 321 n.15 (1980). 
8. Since Virginia publishes little legislative ~tory for its statutes, the Official Comments 
to the Model Act ought to be considered a fertile source in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Revised Statute. The Comments of the Joint Bar Committee, CODE CoMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 1, app. 4, are also helpful. 
9. The relatively small number of reported Virginia cases in the corporate law area makes 
the case law of other jurisdictions having comparable provisions extremely important. 
10. Article 13 of the Old Statute, dealing with Industrial Development Corporations, has 
been removed from the Stock Corporation Act and placed as a separate chapter within title 
13.1. See REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-981 to -998. 
11. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-601 to -614. 
12. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-603, -610, -611, for example, define the follow-
ing terms: articles of incorporation, certificate, commission, conspicuous, domestic and for-
eign corporation, deliver, distribution, effective date, employee, entity, principal office, pro-
ceeding, record date, share, shareholder, state, subscriber, United States, voting group, 
notice, and number of shareholders. Many of these terms will be discussed in connection 
with the substantive provisions employing them. 
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this point. Revised Statute section 13.1-606(A), in contrast, pro-
vides that the articles13 based upon which the certificate is issued 
may state an effective date up to fifteen days after the date of issu-
ance. This flexibility may be extremely helpful in facilitating the 
conclusion of many corporate transactions such as mergers.14 
B. Article Two-Fees115 
Article Two prescribes the fees to be collected by the 
Commission. 
C. Article Three-Formation of Corporations16 
Article Three provides for the formation of corporations. Re-
vised Statute section 13.1-618 continues the limited role of incor-
porators. Their sole function is to sign and file the articles of incor-
poration with the Commission. Since "person" is defined in 
Revised Statute section 13.1-603 as an individual or an entity, a 
corporation can serve as an incorporator. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-619(A) lists the information which 
must be set forth in the articles of incorporation. This section does 
not substantively differ from Old Statute section 13.1-49, except 
that it eliminates the required statement of purposeP Revised 
Statute section 13.1-619(B) expands, or at least makes more ex-
plicit, the optional clauses which may be included in the articles. 
Of particular advantange to the closely held corporation is the 
allowance of provisions "[r]egarding the management of the busi-
ness and ... affairs of the corporation" and those "[d]efining, lim-
iting, and regulating the powers of the corporation, its directors, 
and shareholders."18 This section explicitly acknowledges, to a 
greater degree than the Old Statute did, the possibility of molding 
the roles of the directors and shareholders in managing the affairs 
13. "Articles" are defined in REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-603, to include articles 
of incorporation and all amendments thereto, and articles of merger. 
14. It was sometimes difficult under the Old Statute to coordinate filings in the states of 
incorporation of the parties to a merger so as to assure effectiveness on the same day the 
Commission issued the certificate of merger. 
15. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-615 to -617. 
16. Id. §§ 13.1-618 to -625. 
17. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
18. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-619(B)(3)(b) & (c). The Official Comment to 
MoDEL ACT, supra note 4, § 2.02, on which this section is based, contains a helpful list of 
common types of optional provisions. 
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of a closely held corporation in order to give the shareholders a 
more active role. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-619(B)(3) is introduced by the qual-
ifying language that optional provisions included in the articles not 
be inconsistent with law. This section, therefore, does not expressly 
validate any particular management allocation provision. The le-
gality of such provisions must be determined by other portions of 
the statute or by the case law. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-622, which has no analog in the Old 
Statute, provides that persons purporting to act on behalf of a cor-
poration knowing that there is no incorporation are jointly and 
severally liable for the liabilities created while so acting. They are 
not liable, however, to persons who also know that there is no in-
corporation. This provision follows from the Model Act's position 
that corporate existence begins upon issuance of the certificate of 
incorporation. If conduct is engaged in, or liability incurred, before 
corporate existence, those persons acting for or as a corporation 
must be personally responsible.19 
Unlike the Model Act, however, the Revised Statute qualifies 
this liability. Under section 13.1-622, the persons acting for or as a 
corporation are not liable to persons who also knew there was no 
incorporation. This exception thus allows a limited version of "cor-
poration by estoppel."20 Section 13.1-622 confers, in this narrow 
instance, the advantage of limited liability on persons acting for or 
as a corporation even though they know that in fact there is no 
effective corporation. Therefore, it probably ought to be narrowly 
construed to operate only against persons having actual knowledge, 
not just reason to know, of the lack of corporate status. 
19. The doctrine of de facto corporations is mooted by the Model Act. Liability is limited 
to those persons acting as, or on behalf of, the purported corporation. Passive investors are 
not liable. MonEL Ac:r, supra note 4, §§ 2.03, 2.04, 2.04 official comment; see Timberlane 
Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109 (1973). 
20. See Cranson v. International Business Machs., 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964). The 
concept of "corporation by estoppel" is based on the premise that the plaintiff, often a 
creditor, intended to deal with the entity and not with the individuals as such. Plaintiff 
therefore ought to be limited to seeking recourse only from the entity with which he in fact 
intended to deal. 
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D. Article Four-Purposes and Powers21 
Article Four contains those sections dealing with the corpora-
tion's purposes and powers. Revised Statute section 13.1-626 states 
that, unless a limited purpose is stated in the articles of incorpora-
tion or is required by law, a corporation's purpose is to engage "in 
any lawful business." Old Statute section 13.1-49(b) allowed a cor-
poration to adopt this broad purpose by specific provision in the 
articles. The Revised Statute reverses this presumption and states 
that a corporation has this broad purpose unless it adopts, or is 
required by law to have, a narrower purpose. Thus, nothing need 
be stated in the articles about purpose unless a narrower one is 
desired.22 
Revised Statute section 13.1-627 corresponds to Old Statute sec-
tion 13.1-2.1 and lists the statutory powers conferred on corpora-
tions unless limited by the articles. This section carries forward 
into the Revised Statute some broader authorizations than are 
contained in the Model Act analog, section 3.02. For example, it 
sanctions payments to officers, directors and employees for previ-
ously rendered services, even though the payments are not made 
pursuant to a prior agreement. It also confers the power to obtain 
life insurance on any officer, director or employee, and on any 
shareholder for the purpose of acquiring his shares on death. 
While this extensive list of powers is helpful, it is probably not 
necessary. The introductory portions of both Revised Statute sec-
tion 13.1-627 and Model Act section 3.02 state that a corporation 
has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or 
convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including without 
limitation those powers listed. Arguably, if the section ended after 
that grant of power, it would not be more restrictive than as 
drafted with the list. This list is nonetheless useful for illustrative 
purposes. 23 
21. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-626 to -629. 
22. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-619, makes this point clear. It lists in section 
13.1-619(A) the four elements which must be included in the articles of incorporation: (1) 
the name; (2) the number of authorized shares; (3) the distinguishing rights of shares if 
more than one class is authorized; and (4) the name of the registered agent and the address 
of the registered office. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-619(B)(3)(a), states that a 
corporation may set forth in the articles "the purpose or purposes for which the corporation 
is organized." The Official Comment to MoDEL Ac:r, supra note 4, § 3.01, notes that, because 
the allowance of the broad purpose clause is almost universal among the states, there ap-
pears to be no reason not to make it the norm. 
23. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-627(A)(17), like OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 
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Revised Statute section 13.1-629 carries forward the thrust of 
Old Statute section 13.1-5 in strictly limiting the viability of the 
ultra vires doctrine. Section 13.1-629(A) states the general proposi-
tion tha.t corporate action generally cannot be challenged on the 
ground that the corporation lacked the power to act; and section 
13.1-629(B) states the three instances in which the lack of author-
ity can be raised. 
The wording of this section makes it clear that completed corpo-
rate conduct, even if unauthorized, cannot be set aside to the dis-
advantage of the other party to the transaction. Given the preva-
lence of the broad corporate purpose clause and the power to do 
"all things necessary or convenient" to accomplish the broad pur-
pose, the likelihood of challenge to corporate action under this sec-
tion is not great. 
The section does not substantively change, however, the provi-
sions of Old Statute section 13.1-5 in stating the three grounds on 
which the lack of authority can be raised. The corporation's lack of 
power to act may be challenged by a shareholder suing to enjoin 
the act. This ground, of course, would apply to corporate action 
not yet concluded. The corporation may sue for damages the indi-
viduals performing the unauthorized act. And finally, a proceeding 
seeking involuntary dissolution may be brought before the 
Commission. 
E. Article Five-Name; Article Six-Office and Agent24 
Article Five contains three sections regarding corporate names, 
their reservation and registration. A separate section provides, as 
did old Statute section 13.1-127, for the Commission's issuance of a 
certificate reciting the change of corporate name or succession to 
ownership. This certificate may be admitted to record in the re-
cording office where corporate property is located to maintain the 
continuity of title records. 
Article Six's provisions regarding the registered office and agent 
make explicit the limited role of the registered agent. Revised Stat-
ute section 13.1-634(B) provides that the sole function of the regis-
tered agent is to forward to the corporation any notice served on 
13.1-2.1(q), in an effort at "overkill," contains a final catch-all clause allowing a corporation 
to have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect its purposes. 
24. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-630 to -633 (Article 5); id. §§ 13.1-634 to -637 
(Article 6). 
76 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:67 
him. Revised Statute section 13.1-636 adds a procedure whereby 
the registered agent may resign. 25 
F. Article Seven-Shares and Distributions26 
Article Seven, dealing with shares and distributions, differs sub-
stantially from the Old Statute in its treatment of these issues. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-638, regarding authorized shares, 
covers the concepts contained in Old Statute sections 13.1-12 and-
13. Revised Statute section 13.1-638(A), like Old Statute section 
13.1-12, states that the corporation shall have such classes of 
shares and authorized number of shares as are stated in the arti-
cles of incorporation. If more than one class is authorized, the rela-
tive rights, preferences and distinguishing designations of the clas-
ses must be stated in the articles of incorporation. The statute 
contains no reference to par value.27 
Section 13.1-638(B) requires every corporation to authorize one 
or more classes of shares possessing the two fundamental rights of 
plenary voting power and of receiving the net assets of the corpo-
ration on dissolution. The same class of shares need not possess 
both of these rights. 28 In addition, as stated in Revised Statute sec-
tion 13.1-638(C), the articles of incorporation may authorize one or 
more classes having the typical rights and preferences of preferred 
shares, including special voting, liquidation, redemption or conver-
sion features. 
The traditional terms "common," "preferred" and "special" clas-
ses of shares are intentionally omitted from the Revised Statute. 
Neither the precise definition of these categories nor their legal sig-
nificance has been clear for many years.29 Although section 13.1-
638(A) requires a specific descriptive designation for each class, it 
assigns no legal consequence to the descriptive designation. Ac-
cordingly, articulation of the relative rights of the classes of shares 
in the articles is extremely important. 
25. A comparable provision was deleted from the Old Statute in 1981. 
26. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-638 to -653. 
27. See generally infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. Under the Old Statute, char-
ter, entrance and annual registration fees and franchise taxes for stock corporations were 
based on the amount of authorized capital stock. Elimination of the concept of par value 
necessitated a change in the basis used to compute these fees and taxes. They will be based 
on the number of authorized shares. See VA. CoDE ANN. tit. 58.1 (Repl. Vol. 1982). 
28. See MODEL Ar:r, supra note 4, § 6.01 official comment. 
29. See id. § 6.01(B) official comment; Murphy, supra note 7, at 331-39. 
1985] VIRGINIA STOCK CORPORATION ACT 77 
Revised Statute section 13.1-638(C)(2) adds flexibility with re-
spect to the redemption or conversion of shares. It specifically al-
lows the terms or formula by which the redemption price or con-
version ratio is determined to be stated in the articles of 
incorporation, or to be determined by extrinsic data or events 
identified in the articles. 30 Moreover, the shares can be made re-
deemable at the option of the holder, the corporation or some 
other person. Old Statute section 13.1-13(a) authorized provisions 
providing for redemption at the option of the corporation. The Re-
vised Statute balances this right by providing for redemption at 
the option of the corporation or shareholder. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-638(B) clearly states that every cor-
poration must have at least one class of shares possessing plenary 
voting rights and one class having the right to receive the net as-
sets of the corporation upon dissolution. If more than one class of 
shares is authorized, the precise rights of all classes must be stated 
in the articles so that it is clear which class has these fundamental 
rights. 
It is somewhat unclear whether a statement of the voting and 
net asset distribution rights must be articulated in the articles if 
only one class is authorized. Revised Statute section 13.1-638(A) 
supports the argument that they need not be. It states that if more 
than one class is authorized, the articles must state the distin-
guishing characteristics and rights of each class. But Revised Stat-
ute section 13.1-638(B) requires that the articles authorize one or 
more classes possessing plenary voting and net asset distribution 
rights. 
The Official Comment to Model Act section 6.01 states that if 
only one class is authorized, no statement of the rights need be 
made. If two or more classes are authorized, one of which possesses 
these fundamental rights, that class need only be described as 
"common shares" or shares having general distribution and voting 
rights. 31 This instruction does assign legal consequences to the 
term "common shares," even though the thrust of the Model Act 
generally is to focus on the statement of rights in the articles. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-639 carries forward the notion of 
30. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 324-29. 
31. MoDEL Ar:r, supra note 4, § 6.01 official comment. Since REVISED STATUTE, supra note 
1, § 13.1-638(A) & (B), substantially tracks the language of MoDEL Ar:r, supra note 4, § 6.01, 
this explanation should resolve any doubt on this point. 
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"blank stock." It allows the board of directors, if so authorized by 
the articles, to define the rights of any class of shares by filing an 
amendment to the articles before any shares of the class are issued. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-640 is new to Virginia law. This sec-
tion first authorizes the corporation to issue up to the number of 
shares of each class stated in the articles of incorporation. These 
issued shares are outstanding until they are reacquired, redeemed, 
converted or cancelled pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1-
653. Revised Statute section 13.1-640(C) allows, if the articles so 
provide, all shares to be redeemed, whether they are called pre-
ferred or common, so long as one share remains outstanding which 
possesses plenary voting and net asset distribution rights. 
This provision resolves the uncertainty in prior law regarding 
whether common shares can be redeemed. By one school of 
thought they could, if a class of non-redeemable common shares 
remained outstanding. This, in turn, led to the question of whether 
the redeemable shares were in fact common, preferred or a special 
class.32 Revised Statute section 13.1-640 eliminates the issue by al-
lowing all shares to be redeemed so long as one share possessing 
plenary rights remains outstanding. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-641, dealing with fractional shares, 
changes prior Virginia law. It provides the board of directors with 
a range of options in dealing with fractional interests. The board 
may issue fractional shares or pay in money the value of the frac-
tional interest. It may also arrange for the disposition of the frac-
tional shares, or it may issue scrip. 
Old Statute section 13.1-21 did not authorize the issuance of 
fractional shares, except in open-end investment trusts; it allowed 
only the issuance of scrip or payment of the value of the fractional 
share. Revised Statute section 13.1-641 is introduced by the lan-
guage "[a] corporation may, if authorized by its board of direc-
tors .... " (emphasis added). Consequently, the board is able to 
exercise its discretion and determine in any instance how to deal 
with fractional interests. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-643, regarding the issuance of 
shares, is one of the first sections, in order of occurrence, to give 
effect to the Model Act's revised financial provisions;33 and it sig-
32. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 331-39. 
33. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text. 
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nificantly changes prior Virginia law contained in Old Statute sec-
tions 13.1-17 and -18. The concepts of par value, stated capital, 
earned and capital surplus, and treasury stock have been elimi-
nated from the Model Act. The Revised Statute follows this 
change. Accordingly, the allocation of the consideration received 
for shares to stated capital and capital surplus, as provided in Old 
Statute section 13.1-18, and the determination of the consideration 
which must be paid for newly issued or treasury shares, as stated 
in Old Statute sections 13.1-17 and -18, are unnecessary. In their 
place, Revised Statute section 13.1-643(B) first states that any is-
suance of shares must be authorized by the board, then lists the 
types of consideration which may be accepted in exchange for 
shares. This list includes any tangible or intangible property or 
benefit to the corporation, including cash, property, promissory 
notes, or past or future services. 
This list of valid types of consideration does not depart from 
prior Virginia law.34 Jlowever, Revised Statute section 13.1-643(C) 
does change prior Virginia law. By its terms, the good faith deter-
mination of the board that the consideration received or to be re-
ceived by the corporation is adequate is conclusive. Upon receipt 
of this consideration, the shares are deemed to be fully paid and 
non-assessable. The board is not required by this section to deter-
mine the adequacy of the value of the consideration for all pur-
poses. The "adequacy" determination required by this section es-
tablishes only whether the shares are validly issued and fully paid. 
Old Statute section 13.1-17 required that the directors place a dol-
lar value on the consideration, and this valuation was deemed con-
clusive in the absence of fraud.35 Moreover, the "absence of fraud" 
standard used in the Old Statute has been replaced in this section 
by a "good faith standard." 
Shares issued in exchange for promissory notes or contracts for 
future services are deemed to be fully paid, assuming the board's 
determination of the adequacy of consideration, when it accepts 
the promissory note or the contract for services. Revised Statute 
section 13.1-643(D) contains some protective measures (including 
34. The prohibition on acceptance of promissory notes or future services was eliminated 
from OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-17, in 1975. 
35. MonEL ACT, supra note 4, § 6.21 official comment, notes that the directors need not, 
but may, place specific dollar value on noncash consideration. The comment recognizes that 
some value must be placed on consideration for accounting purposes, but that the determi-
nation of such values is not necessarily the responsibility of the board. 
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escrow of the shares, transfer restriction and credit of distribu-
tions) which a corporation may employ to insure that the services 
are performed or the note paid. These measures do not affect the 
fully paid and non-assessable status of the shares; they only pro-
vide security for performance or payment. 
Finally, Revised Statute section 13.1-643 does not allow the 
shareholders to restrict the board's authority to issue shares, as did 
Old Statute section 13.1-17. Section 13.1-643 authorizes the board 
to issue the shares, and it sets forth the procedures under which 
the shares may be issued. It does allow the shareholders to reserve 
for themselves this same prerogative by a provision in the articles 
of incorporation. It appears, however, that the substantive provi-
sions of the section cannot be modified. If no provision is con-
tained in the articles, the board will perform this function on the 
terms stated in section 13.1-643. With a provision in the articles, 
the shareholders will perform this function, but under the same 
terms and procedures stated in the section. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-644 provides that the sole liability 
of the shareholder is to pay the consideration for which the shares 
were authorized to be issued to him. Revised Statute section 13.1-
644(B) fixes this amount as the consideration which the board or 
the shareholders determine in good faith to be adequate. 36 
Revised Statute section 13.1-649 codifies principles that perhaps 
existed, albeit inchoate, in prior Virginia law.37 It explicitly autho-
rizes share transfer restrictions, be they in the articles of incorpo-
ration, bylaws, a shareholders' agreement, or an agreement be-
tween the corporation and shareholders. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-649(B) makes such restrictions en-
forceable against a holder or any transferee if the restriction is 
noted on the share certificate or contained in the information 
statement required with respect to uncertificated shares. It is not 
otherwise enforceable against a person without knowledge of the 
restriction. 
36. A transferee in good faith, and without knowledge that the consideration has not been 
paid, would not be liable to the corporation or creditors for any unpaid portion of the con-
sideration; but the original holder would remain liable. 
37. See OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-24. Reasonable restrictions on the transfer of 
stock were permissible under prior law because the corporation's charter was viewed as a 
contract between the corporation and its shareholders, as well as between the shareholders 
themselves. However, such restrictions were strictly construed by the courts. See Monacan 
Hills v. Page, 203 Va. 110, 122 S.E.2d 654 (1961). 
1985] VIRGINIA STOCK CORPORATION ACT 81 
Revised Statute section 13.1-649(C) sanctions restrictions in-
tended to serve any reasonable purpose, including preservation of 
securities act exemptions or closely held corporation status. Sec-
tion 13.1-649(D) lists typical transfer and registration restrictions, 
including the right of first refusal or option, approval before trans-
fer, and prohibition of transfer to designated classes of persons, if 
the class is not unreasonable. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-651 maintains the traditional Vir-
ginia approach to preemptive rights.38 They exist unless limited or 
denied in the articles of incorporation. Although Revised Statute 
section 13.1-651 confers the right generally, it continues the com-
mon practice of denying the right with respect to shares offered for 
other than money or to officers or employees pursuant to plans ap-
proved by the shareholders. Moreover, the right does not extend to 
shares having distribution preferences, shares without general vot-
ing power, or to shares having preferential rights to distributions 
unless they are convertible into shares without that right. In all of 
these instances, the preemptive right would exist only if specifi-
cally provided in the articles of incorporation. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-653(G) clarifies the corporation's 
right to issue the shares not acquired by the present shareholders 
pursuant to their preemptive right. The corporation may offer 
these shares to others for a period of one year at a price not lower 
than that offered to the existing shareholders. If the shares are of-
fered after one year or at a lower price, the preemptive right is 
again triggered. 
The statutory qualifications on the preemptive right make it a 
less attractive right than may initially appear. The right is particu-
larly important in the closely held corporation context, when rela-
tive voting position is critical. Yet the statutory exemptions pre-
sent the corporation or majority shareholder with various ways of 
avoiding the right. Shares issued for property or services, for exam-
pie, do not trigger the right. Consequently, holders of preemptive 
rights cannot take too much comfort in them. 39 
38. This section is more complete than OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-23, but does 
not substantively differ from it; and it follows MoDEL Acr, supra note 4, § 6.30, except in 
the "opt out" variant. MoDEL Acr, supra note 4, § 6.30, provides, like the law of many 
states, that preemptive rights do not exist unless provided for in the articles. A statement in 
the articles to the effect that the corporation elects to have preemptive rights is sufficient to 
confer statutory preemptive rights. 
39. Any abusive avoidance of the preemptive right by a corporation or its majority share-
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Revised Statute section 13.1-652 authorizes a corporation to re-
acquire shares of its stock and states the consequence of the reac-
quisition on the corporation's capital structure. The shares on re-
acquisition are returned to the status of authorized but unissued 
shares. They can be freely reissued unless the articles of incorpora-
tion prohibit reissue. If reissue is prohibited, the authorized num-
ber of shares in the class is reduced on reacquisition by the num-
ber of reacquired shares through an amendment to the articles of 
incorporation. In this event, the corporation is obligated to adopt, 
by action of the board without shareholder approval, an amend-
ment to the articles and to file it with the Commission. 
Elimination of the concepts of par value, stated capital, earned 
and capital surplus, and treasury shares from the Revised Statute 
greatly simplifies the procedures for and accounting consequences 
of share reacquisitions. 40 Elimination of these accounting concepts 
also has the salutary effect of eliminating the distinction between a 
reacquisition and a redemption. Consequently, the separate provi-
sions regarding a redemption set forth in Old Statute section 13.1-
62 have not been retained.41 
Since a reacquisition of shares fits within the definition of a dis-
tribution,42 Revised Statute section 13.1-652 merely states the con-
sequence of the reacquisition to the corporation's authorized capi-
tal. The question of whether a corporation may reacquire shares 
and the impact of the reacquisition on the financial position of the 
corporation are governed by Revised Statute section 13.1-653, 
which authorizes distributions to shareholders. 
Section l 3.1-653 is probably the capstone of the financial provi-
sions in the Revised Statute. This section is an enactment of 
Model Act section 6.40 without change. It thereby gives full effect 
to the Model Act's aim of revising the accounting and financial 
provisions to better reflect today's financial realities.43 Elimination 
holder would raise issues of fiduciary duty, however. 
40. The procedures for cancellation of shares and reduction in capital as contained in OLD 
STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-63, -64, are no longer necessary and have not been carried 
over into the Revised Statute. 
41. See generally Murphy, supra note 7. 
42. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-603. 
43. See Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments to Financial Pro-
visions, A Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, 34 Bus. LAw. 1867 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Changes]. The revised financial provisions of the Model Act are essentially con-
tained in this report. They were adopted by the Committee on Corporate Laws in 1980. 
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments to Financial Provisions: A 
1985] VIRGINIA STOCK CORPORATION ACT 83 
of the concepts of par value, stated capital, earned and capital sur-
plus, and treasury shares from the definitional and operational sec-
tions of the Revised Statute surely provides flexibility in account-
ing for both the consideration received for shares and their 
reacquisition. However, it is in the context of a distribution to 
shareholders that the full significance of these changes is 
apparent.44 
A distribution is defined in Revised Statute section 13.1-603 as a 
"transfer of money or other property, except its own shares, or in-
currence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of 
its shareholders in respect of any of its shares." A distribution thus 
includes transactions commonly thought of as dividends, share 
purchases, redemptions and liquidation distributions; and the cur-
rency for these distributions is money, property or debt. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-653(A) authorizes the board to 
make any distribution to shareholders, subject only to any restric-
tion in the articles of incorporation and Revised Statute section 
13.1-653(C). Thus, the requirements of the Old Statute-that divi-
dends be paid or that shares be repurchased only out of earned or 
capital surplus, and that stated capital not be paid out to the 
shareholders until liquidation-have been abandoned.45 Under Re-
vised Statute section 13.1-653, a corporation is free to pay out vir-
tually its entire net worth to its shareholders, subject to Revised 
Statute section 13.1-653(C). 
Section 13.1-653(C) sets forth two constraints on distributions, 
the "equity" and "balance sheet" solvency limitations. No distri-
bution can be made under this section if, after giving effect to it, 
the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become 
due in the usual course of business (equity solvency), or if its total 
assets would be less than its liabilities and the amount of any liq-
uidation preference of shares senior to the class receiving the dis-
tribution (balance sheet solvency). 
Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, 35 Bus. LAW. 1365 (1980). The commentary 
contained in Changes has been somewhat reworked in the Official Comment to MoDEL Am:, 
supra note 4, § 6.40. 
44. See generally B. MANNING, A CoNCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPirAL (2d ed. 1981); 
Murphy, Equity Insolvency and the New Model Business Corporation Act, 15 U. RicH. L. 
REV. 839 (1981); Note, The 1980 Amendments to the Financial Provisions of the Model 
Business Corporation Act: A Positive Alternative to the New York Statutory Approach, 47 
ALB. L. REV. 1019 (1983). 
45. See generally B. MANNING, supra note 44, at 165-80; Murphy, supra note 44. 
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Although section 13.1-653(C) frees corporate managers from the 
artificial constraints of earned and capital surplus, it does require 
of them some sophisticated judgments about the corporation's fu-
ture. Revised Statute section 13.1-653(D) allows these solvency de-
terminations to be based on financial statements prepared on the 
basis of accounting practices which are reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, or on fair valuation or any other reasonable method. 
Once the accounting method is chosen, the balance sheet sol-
vency test is fairly easy to apply. However, the equity solvency test 
requires careful analysis of the corporation's liquidity and the fu-
ture course of its business. Unfortunately, the analysis and judg-
ments it demands are not within the everyday experience of many 
directors, especially those of small closely held corporations. 46 
Revised Statute section 13.1-653(E) states that the tests are to 
be applied generally on the earlier of the dates the money is paid 
or the indebtedness incurred. If the distribution is made by prom-
issory note or installment payment, the operative date is the date 
on which the obligation is incurred, not the date on which it is 
paid.47 
The Official Comment to Model Act section 6.40 notes that the 
two solvency judgments are used to determine both the validity of 
the distribution and the liability of the directors for improper dis-
tributions. It acknowledges that comparable solvency standards are 
used in the bankruptcy and fraudulent conveyance settings for 
other purposes. The comment, however, states that, in view of the 
46. Fortunately, the Official Comment to MoDEL Ac:r, supra note 4, § 6.40, contains help· 
ful guidance with respect to the framework within which these judgments must be made and 
offers a methodology to be employed. The comment indicates that application of the equity 
solvency test requires a cash flow analysis, based on a business forecast and budget, for a 
time period sufficient to assess whether known liabilities reasonably can be expected to be 
met as they mature. The equity solvency test is not new; it has been a separate test under 
the Old Statute and almost every other state's corporation law for decades. However, it now 
assumes a greater importance. See Murphy, supra note 44. Although that article discusses 
the financial provisions and comments as contained in Changes, supra note 43, the text of 
the relevant provisions is virtually unchanged and the Official Comments are not substan-
tively different from the commentary in Changes. 
47. An argument can be made that the test should be applied on the date of payment 
since until that time no money actually leaves the corporation. See Williams v. Nevelow, 513 
S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1974). However, payment of the indebtedness often would be made as a 
routine corporate matter with no review by the board. Moreover, incurrence of the debt is 
sufficient for balance sheet solvency purposes since the amount of the debt is a liability. 
Likewise for equity solvency purposes, the obligation to make the payment in the future is a. 
factor to be considered in the cash flow analysis required to determine if the distribution 
can be made. 
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differing purposes of these laws, it is unnecessary that these tests 
as applied under the Model Act be interpreted identically to the 
solvency tests employed in those settings. Accordingly the body of 
case and statutory law from those fields should not be controlling 
for corporate law purposes.48 
G. Article Eight-Shareholders49 
Article Eight of the Revised Statute contains the provisions re-
lating to shareholder action at meetings or otherwise. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-654, regarding annual meetings, is 
comparable to Old Statute section 13.1-25, except that it codifies 
the common law rule that failure to hold an annual meeting does 
not affect the validity of any corporate action. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-655 deals with special shareholder 
meetings. This section changes prior Virginia law and is an at-
tempt to protect Virginia corporations from unwanted takeovers. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-655(A)(1) is based on the Delaware 
statute, 150 not the Model Act. It states that a special meeting shall 
be held at the call of the board, its chairman, the president of the 
corporation or the persons authorized by the articles of incorpora-
tion. Therefore, shareholders cannot demand a special meeting un-
less they are authorized to do so in the articles. Thus, without an 
article provision the holders of even a majority of the shares could 
not demand a meeting for the purpose of removing a director or 
considering a merger proposal. 
Old Statute section 13.1-25 allowed the holders of ten percent of 
the shares to demand a meeting.151 It was generally thought that 
this ten percent provision could not be varied in the articles of 
incorporation or bylaws.152 This provision, allowing a demand by a 
48. Since there is relatively little corporate distribution solvency case law, the inclination 
would be to look to the bankruptcy and fraudulent conveyance solvency case law, which is 
highly developed on these points. The comment may caution against this inclination. 
49. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-654 to -672. 
50. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (Repl. Vol. 1983). 
51. MoDEL Ar:r, supra note 4, § 7.02, provides that a special meeting may be called at the 
demand of the listed persons or the holders of 10% of the shares entitled to vote on the 
issue-a provision very similar to OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-25. 
52. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-25, stated that special meetings may be called "by 
the chairman . . ., president, the board of directors, the holders of not less than one tenth of 
all shares entitled to vote at the meeting, or such other officers or persons as may be author-
ized in the articles of incorporation or the bylaws." The statute specifically provided the 
percentage of shareholders which could call a special meeting. It did not allow this provision 
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fairly low percentage of the shares, may have made Virginia corpo-
rations particularly vulnerable to takeover. Since the ten percent 
shareholder demand provision was widely thought to be 
mandatory, there was no need, or value, in having a provision in 
the articles of incorporation on this point. The Revised Statute 
thus substantively changes Virginia law on this point. Without a 
provision in the articles, the shareholders in many Virginia corpo-
rations have no right to demand a shareholders' meeting. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-655(A)(2) states a separate, addi-
tional rule for small corporations. By its terms, in addition to the 
listed persons, twenty percent of the shares entitled to vote on the 
issue to be considered may demand153 a shareholders' meeting of 
corporations having thirty-five or fewer shareholders of record. Re-
vised Statute section 13.1-655(B) allows an increase or decrease in 
the percentage of shares which may demand a meeting. By anal-
ogy, Revised Statute section 13.1-655(A)(1) would presumably 
sanction any percentage for shareholder demand in the over-
thirty-five-shareholder corporation, if specifically stated in the ar-
ticles of incorporation. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-655(E) makes explicit that only the 
matters stated in the notice may be considered at a special 
meeting. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-656 is a remedial section, allowing a 
court to order the holding of an annual or special meeting if it is 
not held on proper demand. The court is authorized to fix the time 
for the meeting and to determine the shares entitled to notice and 
voting rights. Model Act section 7.03, on which section 13.1-656 is 
based, also allows the court to establish special quorum require-
ments for a court-ordered meeting. Such a provision avoids the sit-
uation in which a majority shareholder stays away from a meeting 
for the purpose of frustrating the quorum, with the consequence 
that the meeting cannot be held. Revised Statute section 13.1-656 
does not include this provision. Under section 13.1-656, a court 
to be modified by the articles or bylaws. It was only if the last words of the section ("or 
persons as may be authorized") were interpreted to apply to a different percentage of share-
holders that the one-tenth provision could have been modified. See OLD STATUTE, supra 
note 1, § 13.1-25. 
53. The shareholders make this demand by delivering written dated demands to the sec-
retary of the corporation, stating the purpose for which a meeting is demanded. The date 
the first shareholder signs the demand is the date of record. for determining which share-
holders are entitled to make the demand. 
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may order the meeting and require that notice be given; but the 
section does not upset any strategy among the shareholders to 
frustrate the quorum.154 The usual quorum and voting rules apply. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-657 fills gaps in the Old Statute re-
garding action without a meeting. Any shareholder action can be 
taken without a meeting by the unanimous written consent of the 
shareholders entitled to vote on the matter. To be valid, the con-
sent must state the date on which each shareholder signed. The 
corporate action evidenced by the consent is deemed to be taken 
by the shareholders and is effective according to its terms when all 
the written consents are in the possession of the corporation. A 
shareholder may withdraw his consent by written notice of with-
drawal to the corporation before all consents have been received by 
it.1515 
Revised Statute section 13.1-658 extends from fifty to sixty days 
the maximum time period in advance of an annual or special meet-
ing by which notice must be given.156 Unless otherwise fixed, the 
record date, for purposes of determining the shareholders entitled 
to notice and to vote, is the close of business on the day before the 
effective date of notice. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-659 states, more precisely than Old 
Statute section 13.1-27, .the procedure for waiver of notice. Waiver 
is either by written waiver delivered to the secretary of the corpo-
ration or by attendance at the meeting. Under Revised Statute sec-
tion 13.1-659(B), attendance at the meeting constitutes a waiver of 
any objection to lack of, or defective, notice unless at the beginning 
of the meeting the shareholder objects to the holding of the meet-
ing. It also constitutes a waiver of the propriety of a discussion of a 
particular matter unless the shareholder objects to the matter 
54. For cases illustrating the ability of a majority shareholder to defeat a quorum and 
thus prevent a meeting from being held, see Hall v. Hall, 506 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1974); 
Gearing v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1962). 
55. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-657, requires that notice of certain proposed 
corporate action, such as amendments to the articles, mergers, share exchanges, sales of 
corporate assets other than in the ordinary course of business, and dissolutions, be given to 
nonvoting shares. If any of these actions are to be taken by unanimous written consent, 
notice must be given to the nonvoting shares at least 10 days before the action is taken; and 
the written consents must state that such notice was given. 
56. Under REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-658, notice must be given not less than 
10 nor more than 60 days before the meeting. However, if the meeting is to consider signifi-
cant corporate transactions, including amendments to the articles of incorporation, mergers, 
share exchanges, sales of assets, or dissolutions, notice must be given not less than 25 nor 
more than 60 days before the meeting. 
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when it is presented. 
Certain fundamental corporate transactions, such as amend-
ments to the articles of incorporation, mergers, share exchanges, 
sales of assets other than in the ordinary course of business and 
dissolution, require that notice be given to both the voting and 
nonvoting shares.117 Although Revised Statute section 13.1-659 does 
not explicitly so state, it appears that for a waiver of notice be 
effective for those transactions, it must be obtained from all the 
shareholders, voting and nonvoting. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-660, regarding the record date, is 
not significantly different from Old Statute section 13.1-29, except 
that the provision for closing the transfer books in lieu of fixing a 
record date has not been carried forward. Consequently, a record 
date must be fixed. If a record date is not provided for in the by-
laws, it may be fixed by the board. It may not, however, be more 
than seventy days before the date of the meeting or action requir-
ing the determination of shareholders. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-661, regarding the shareholder list 
for the meeting, is largely a restatement of Old Statute section 
13.1-30. It makes clear, however, a point on which the Old Statute 
was silent. Failure to make the list available (as required by sec-
tion 13.1-661) does not invalidate action taken at the meeting 
before a demand for the list is made. But action taken after such a 
demand is invalid and without effect.118 
Revised Statute section 13.1-662, regarding the voting entitle-
ment of shares, is comparable to Old Statute section 13.1-32 in ar-
ticulating who has the right to vote the shares held by interests 
such as corporations, fiduciaries, partnerships, executors and joint 
tenants. It embraces the general principle that each voting share is 
entitled to one vote. It does not, however, answer the question of 
whether different voting rights within the same class of shares can 
be authorized.119 
Revised Statute section 13.1-663 is more comprehensive in its ar-
57. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-658(A). 
58. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-30, validated action taken before the demand, but 
is silent as to action taken after the demand. Obviously, such action should be invalid; oth-
erwise the provision would have been ineffective. 
59. EXPOSURE DRAFr, supra note 4, § 7.21 official comment, indicates that such a distinc-
tion is appropriate, citing the Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Providence & Worchester 
Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977). The Official Comment to MoDEL ACT, supra note 4, § 
7.21, omits any discussion of this point. 
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ticulation of the right to vote by proxy than was its predecessor, 
Old Statute section 13.1-32. The appointment of the proxy is effec-
tive upon receipt by the corporate secretary and is valid for eleven 
months, unless a longer term is specified. The death or incapacity 
of the shareholder does not affect the right of the proxy holder to 
vote, or of the corporation to accept the votes, until notice of the 
death or incapacity is received by the secretary of the corporation. 
This is a modification of the common law rule that death or in-
capacity terminates the proxy holder's auhority.60 This modifica-
tion addresses the needs of the large corporation with numerous 
shareholders. The corporation need not inquire into the validity of 
the proxy and is entitled to presume the viability of the proxy un-
less it has notice of the death or incapacity. 
The rules for irrevocable proxies are clearly set forth in section 
13.1-633. Proxies can be made irrevocable if explicitly so stated in 
the proxy and if it is coupled with an interest in the shares. The 
statute gives some examples of such an interest, including security 
interests and the purchase of the shares. Both of these are prop-
erty interests. Certain contract interests are also sufficient to sup-
port irrevocable proxies, such as when a shareholder is obligated 
by the terms of his employment to give an irrevocable proxy or 
when the shares are subject to a voting agreement. A transferee of 
shares burdened by an irrevocable proxy takes the shares free of 
the proxy if he had no knowledge of its irrevocability and if this 
feature is not noted on the share certificate. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-664 allows, but does not require, a 
corporation to establish a procedure by which the beneficial owner 
of shares held of record by nominees is recognized by the corpora-
tion as the shareholder. This section responds to the desire of a 
corporation to communicate readily with the owners of shares held 
by brokers in street name. Beneficial holders of shares are included 
within the Revised Statute section 13.1-603 definition of "share-
holder" if they are recognized as shareholders under this section. 
As such, they ought to receive directly from the corporation notices 
of meetings, distributions and communications regarding takeover 
attempts. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-665(B) sets forth the circumstances 
under which the corporation, acting in good faith, can accept the 
60. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CoRPORATIONS§ 196 (3d ed. 1983). 
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written vote, consent, waiver or proxy purportedly on behalf of, 
but not precisely in the name of, the shareholder. These situations 
include action on behalf of a shareholder which is an entity and on 
behalf of a fiduciary, trustee or receiver, or agent. The corporation, 
if acting in good faith, is entitled to accept written action by these 
persons. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-665(D), however, allows the corpo-
ration to reject any such vote, consent, waiver or proxy if, acting in 
good faith, it has reasonable doubt about the validity of the signa-
ture or the authority of the agent. Under Revised Statute section 
13.1-665(E), the agent of the corporation who either accepts or re-
jects the vote, consent, waiver or proxy is not liable to the share-
holder for the consequences of the failure to accept or reject them 
if he acts in good faith and in accordance with this section. 
In all instances, the agent may demand reasonable proof of the 
validity of the signature or authority. The burden of proving the 
invalidity of a vote, consent, waiver or proxy is not placed on the 
challenger, as under prior Virginia law. Instead, the corporation's 
agent, acting in good faith, may demand satisfactory proof of au-
thority or validity if he has reasonable basis for doubt; otherwise, 
he must accept the vote, consent, waiver or proxy. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-666 changes prior Virginia law with 
respect to quorums. Revised Statute section 13.1-666(A) states 
that, unless the articles of incorporation or the statute otherwise 
provide, a majority of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter at 
the meeting constitutes a quorum. The statute does not authorize 
bylaw provisions fixing quorums; nor does it indicate what type of 
quorum provisions are authorized in the articles, that is, whether 
more-than-majority or less-than-majority provisions are valid. 
However, Revised Statute section 13.1-668 states that the articles 
may provide for greater quorum or voting requirements than are 
stated in the statute. Old Statute section 13.1-31 authorized article 
provisions raising the quorum or reducing it to no less than one-
third. Since this statute was repealed and replaced by a provision 
which explicitly authorizes only provisions increasing the percent-
age, it appears that less-than-majority quorum provisions are no 
longer valid. 61 
61. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-666 and -668, are substantially based on 
MODEL ACT, supra note 4, §§ 7.25 and 7.27, respectively. This san1e an1biguity exists in the 
Model Act. The Official Comment to Model Act § 7.25 notes that earlier versions of the 
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Revised Statute section 13.1-666(B) provides that once a share is 
present for any purpose, including, apparently, presence for the 
limited purpose of objecting to the propriety of the meeting, it is 
present for quorum purposes. And further, once present a share is 
deemed present for the remainder of the meeting. This reverses 
the holding in Levisa Oil Corp. v. Quigley,62 in which the Virginia 
Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of the majority share-
holder from the meeting frustrated the quorum. Shares present for 
quorum purposes are also present for any adjourned session of the 
meeting unless a new record date is set for the adjourned session. 
This section also changes the number of votes necessary to ap-
prove a matter. Revised Statute section 13.1-666(C) provides that, 
absent a special provision in the articles or statute, a measure is 
passed if the number of votes cast in favor of it exceeds the num-
ber cast against it.63 Under this procedure, abstentions are of no 
effect. Passage merely requires more affirmative than negative 
votes. Old Statute section 13.1-31 provided that passage required a 
majority of the votes present, not of the votes cast. Hence, absten-
tion worked against passage. 
The Revised Statute introduces the notion of "v9ting groups" as 
a convenient term to describe classes or groups of shares having 
the same voting rights. As provided in Revised Statute section 
13.1-638, the exact voting rights of the various groups of shares 
must be expressed in the articles of incorporation. A voting group 
is defined as a class or series of shares which, as provided in the 
articles or statute, is "entitled to vote and be counted together and 
Model Act allowed less-than-majority quorum provisions so long as the quorum was at least 
one-third. The Comment states that this one-third restriction was eliminated because it was 
unreasonably confining in certain situations. Thus the intent of Model Act § 7.25 is to allow 
any supermajority or less-than-majority provision. However, the statutory language does not 
so state, and this intent is undercut by Model Act § 7.27 which, like Revised Statute § 13.1-
668(a), authorizes the articles to require greater quorum or voting provisions than those in 
the statute. It does not authorize less-than-majority quorum provisions. 
62. 217 Va. 898, 234 S.E.2d 257 (1977). The bylaw provision in Levisa Oil Corp. stated 
that a quorum for the transaction of business at any shareholder meeting shall consist of a 
majority of the shares. The court focused on the "for transaction of business" language and 
held that the quorum must be present when business is transacted. I d. at 901, 234 S.E.2d at 
259-60. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-666(B), clearly would change the holding of 
that case. It states that once a share is present for any purpose, it is deemed present for the 
remainder of that meeting and any adjournment thereof. 
63. Very different rules govern shareholder approval of amendments to the articles, merg-
ers or share exchanges, sales of assets, dissolutions, and voting at directors' meetings. See, 
e.g., infra pp. 99-102, 117-19, 121-23, 130 for discussion of these provisions. 
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collectively on a matter at a meeting of shareholders."64 Shares tra-
ditionally thought of as preferred with separate class voting rights 
or, in the closely held corporation context, a class of common 
shares having the right to elect a certain number of directors, con-
stitutes a separate voting group under this definition. 
Revised Statute sections 13.1-666 and -667 apply the quorum 
and voting rules separately to voting groups. Thus, if the matter to 
be considered at the meeting requires the approval of more than 
one voting group voting separately, the requisite quorum and vot-
ing rules must be met separately for each voting group. 
The statutory definition of a voting group and precise voting 
rights of the shares of a class as set forth in the articles are ex-
tremely important in this context. If the articles confer on a class 
general voting rights along with the "common" shares, this class 
does not constitute a separate voting group since the definition of a 
voting group requires that the shares be entitled to vote and be 
counted together and collectively. If the articles or the statute do 
not state that the shares are to be voted separately, there is only 
one voting group, consisting of the "common" shareholders and 
this other class.65 In this example there would be one application 
of the quorum and voting rules to the entire group. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-669 governs the election of direc-
tors. It authorizes cumulative voting for directors if the articles 
provide for it. To ensure that all shareholders realize that the elec-
tion of directors will be by cumulative voting, section 13.1-669(D) 
requires that either the notice of meeting or the proxy statement 
disclose that the election of directors will be by cumulative voting, 
or that a shareholder notify the corporation of his intent to vote 
cumulatively. 
In the absence of any provision in the articles regarding cumula-
tive voting or other voting matters, the election of directors takes 
place as provided in Revised Statute section 13.1-669(A). That sec-
tion states that directors are elected by a plurality of the votes 
cast. Again, it is a plurality of the votes cast, not of those present 
at the meeting. 
64. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-603 (Repl. Vol. 1985). 
65. See MoDEL A~. supra note 4, § 7.26 official comment. The general rule is that all 
shares have the same rights, except to the extent that the articles create distinctions among 
different classes. See Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 
243 (1954). 
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As explained in the Official Comment to Model Act section 7 .28, 
a plurality means that the individuals with the highest number of 
votes cast are elected, even though they may have received less 
. than a majority of all votes cast. In the typical majority-minority 
faction setting, the majority shareholder would elect all of the di-
rectors. In this setting, the plurality rule would not yield a differ-
ent result than the usual majority vote rule. However, if several 
shareholder factions each put up a slate, the slate garnering the 
most votes would win, even though it received less than a majority 
of the votes cast. 66 Under the usual majority vote rule, no slate 
would be elected until it received a majority of the votes. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-671 authorizes voting agreements 
and explicitly exempts them from the voting trust rules. The sub-
stance of this section is not new to Virginia law since Old Statute 
section 13.1-34 also validated such agreements. However, unlike its 
predecessor, section 13.1-671 requires a written agreement. More-
over, section 13.1-663 deems each party to such an agreement to 
have a sufficient interest in the shares of the other parties to sup-
port irrevocable proxies in the shares of the other parties.67 The 
section states that voting agreements are specifically enforceable. 
This provision is intended to encourage courts to enforce the terms 
of the agreement since money damages for violation of the agree-
ment are often not an adequate remedy. 68 
Revised Statute section 13.1-672 codifies a set of procedural 
66. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-662(B), provides that each share is entitled to 
one vote for as many persons as there are directors to be elected. The election could be 
among slates proposed to fill all seats or among individuals proposed to fill a seat. If the 
election is among individuals nominated to fill a seat, each share will have one vote. If the 
election is among competing slates, the statute would appear to again give each share one 
vote which would be cast in favor of one of the slates. 
67. This provision in REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-663, means only that there is 
a sufficient interest to support irrevocability. It does not mean that a proxy given by one 
party to a voting agreement to another party is automatically irrevocable. REVISED STATUTE, 
supra note 1, § 13.1-663(D), states that a proxy is revocable unless it explicitly states that it 
is irrevocable and is supported by an interest in the shares. The provision in REVISED STAT-
UTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-663(D)(5), regarding parties to a voting agreement, merely supplies 
the latter element, the sufficient interest in the shares. 
68. MoDEL Acr, supra note 4, § 7.31 official comment. This provision is intended to en-
courage courts not to follow the approach in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined 
Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947). There the court held that the appropriate rem-
edy was to void the votes of the breaching party that were cast in violation of the agree-
ment. Since the Ringling case dealt with cumulative voting for directors, the court's uphold-
ing of the election, while refusing to count these votes, frustrated the purpose of the 
agreement to the detriment of both the willing and recalcitrant parties. 
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rules for derivative suits for the first time69 in Virginia. The Re-
vised Statute substantially follows the Model Act's approach in 
this matter, thus bringing to Virginia law some of the refinements 
to these procedures which have taken place in recent years. 70 
Section 13.1-672 establishes two prerequisites to maintaining a 
derivative suit. First, the plaintiff must either have been a share-
holder at the time the challenged transaction occurred or have ac-
quired the shares by operation of law from such a shareholder.71 
This provision is a statement of the usual "contemporaneous own-
ership" rule.72 Section 13.1-672 does not require ownership 
throughout the pendency of the suit. 73 Second, the complaint must 
allege with particularity why demand on the board was excused or 
that demand to obtain action by the board was made and refused 
or ignored.74 Revised Statute section 13.1-672(B) allows the court 
69. Although some of the new provisions may be consistent with prior case law, the Old 
Statute contained no provision specifically dealing with this crucial means of enforcing 
shareholder rights. For an excellent compendium of resource material regarding derivative 
suits, see AL.l., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 
(Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as DISCUSSION DRAIT]. 
70. The Model Act's provisions governing derivative suits reflect a reappraisal of these 
procedures in view of the extensive litigation in this area and major developments in corpo-
rate governance generally. MoDEL Ac:r, supra note 4, § 7.40 official comment. The Revised 
Statute thus engrafts onto Virginia law a "state of the art" set of derivative suit procedures. 
71. For purposes of this section, a beneficial owner of shares is deemed a shareholder, but 
the holder of an option or convertible debenture is not. 
72. Some statutes apply the rule at the time of discovery of the wrongful nature of the 
transaction. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 12490(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 1516 (Purdon 1967); DISCUSSION DRAIT, supra note 69, § 7.02(a)(1). See generally Har-
brecht, 1'he Contemporaneous Ownership ·Rule in Shareholders' Deriuatiue Suits, 25 
UCLA L. REv. 1041 (1978). 
73. Some cases have held that a shareholder whose shares are canceled as a result of a 
merger may not maintain a derivative suit to challenge the transaction, even though he met 
the contemporaneous ownership rule. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 
1984); Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 178 Conn. 263, 422 A.2d 311 (1979); Note, Suruiual of 
Rights of Action After Corporate Merger, 78 MICH. L. REv. 250 (1979). DISCUSSION DRAIT, 
supra note 69, § 7.02(a)(2), requires, as one of its criteria, continued ownership unless the 
shareholder ceased to be a shareholder through corporate action in which he did not acqui-
esce. The Revised Statute meets this concern by not requiring continuous ownership. 
74. This requirement follows the general approach of FED. R C1v. P. 23.1. One of the 
exasperating questions in derivative suit litigation is when demand would be futile. The 
comment and reporter's note to DISCUSSION DRAIT, supra note 69, § 7.03, contain an ex-
tremely helpful exposition of the law on this point. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 
(DeL 1984), holds that demand is excused when there is reasonable doubt that the business 
judgment rule would validate the transaction. Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982), would excuse demand when the complaint permits the infer-
ence that the directors lack the requisite disinterest to determine fairly whether the corpo-
rate claim should be pursued. See generally Block & Prussin, Termination of Deriuatiue 
Suits Against Directors on Business Judgment Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. 
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to stay the proceeding if the corporation commences an investiga-
tion of the charges made in the demand. 
Section 13.1-672 does not import into Virginia law the security 
for expenses prerequisite to the derivative suit which had in the 
past been common elsewhere. 711 This requirement was thought to 
discriminate against small shareholders. 
Once commenced, a derivative suit cannot be discontinued or 
settled without the court's approval. If the court determines that 
discontinuance or settlement will substantially affect the share-
holders, the court shall direct that notice be sent to the 
shareholders. 76 
The statute, like Model Act section 7.40 on which it is based, 
takes no position on the troublesome question of what weight 
should be accorded the judgment of the board, or a special litiga-
tion committee of the board, that the suit ought to be dismissed as 
contrary to the best interest of the corporation. 77 By one approach, 
the court is free to inquire into the good faith and independence of 
the decision maker; but assuming these, it will accept the recom-
mendation and dismiss the suit.78 By another approach, the busi-
ness judgment rule is operative. The court would be free to deter-
mine, in addition to good faith and independence, whether there is 
a rational basis for the decision that the suits ought to be dis-
LAw. 1503 (1984); Payson, Dismissal of Derivative Actions: The Debate, 6 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 
522 (1981). 
In Mount v. Radford Trust Co., 93 Va. 427, 25 S.E. 244 (1896), the court noted that 
before a shareholder may maintain a derivative suit, he must demonstrate that demand was 
made and refused, or he must allege that the defendants constitute a majority of the board 
"or that they or a majority of them are under the control of the defendant wrongdoers, so 
that the court may infer that they would refuse to bring such suit." Id. at 430, 25 S.E. at 
245. 
REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-672, does not require a demand on the sharehold-
ers. FED. R C1v. P. 23.1 requires such a demand "if necessary." The Model Act does not 
contain this requirement, and it appears to have been rejected in other recent statutes and 
cases. See DiscussiON DRAFT, supra note 69, § 7.03 reporter's note 7. 
75. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 800(c)-(f) (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1985); N.Y. Bus. 
CoRP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1984). 
76. The statute does not state which party shall bear the cost of this notice, but leaves 
the matter to the court's discretion. MoDEL Ac:r, supra note 4, § 7.40 official comment§ 1(j), 
notes that the Model Act, on which the Revised Statute is based, is unlike some state stat-
utes that impose the cost of notice on a particular party. 
77. See generally Brown, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Special Litigation 
Committee, 43 U. PITT. L. REv. 601 (1982); Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate 
Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96 (1980). 
78. See Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629 (Ala. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 
47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). 
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missed.79 Finally, in several recent cases, courts have declined to 
recognize the decisions of special litigation committees and have 
determined for themselves whether dismissal is in the best interest 
of the parties. 80 In one caSe involving a Virginia corporation, 
Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.,81 the court determined that, 
in addition to reviewing the board's or committee's conclusion, it 
must make its own business judgment of whether maintenance of 
the suit was in the corporation's interest. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-672(D), which has no Model Act 
analog, seems to encourage an active involvement by the court in 
this determination along the lines of the Abella case. Section 13.1-
672(D) authorizes the court to appoint a committee of disinter-
ested directors or other persons to determine whether it is in the 
corporation's best interest to pursue a particular right or remedy. 
This committee is to report its findings to the court, which shall 
consider the report and any other relevant evidence and make the 
final determination as to whether the proceeding ought to be dis-
continued. 82 Presumably the conclusion of the board or a special 
litigation committee could, but need not necessarily, be considered 
by the court as part of the other relevant evidence. 
H. Article Nine-Directors and Otficers88 
Article Nine deals with the election and responsibility of direc-
tors and officers. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-673 states the currently accepted 
charge to the directors that "[a]ll corporate powers shall be exer-
cised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of 
the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of direc-
tors."84 This formulation recognizes that the board does not always 
manage, but that it does retain ultimate responsibility for manage-
ment by the officers and employees. It also recognizes the differing 
79. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981); Block & Prussin, 
supra note 74; Comment, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado: Restricting the Power of Special 
Litigation Committees to Terminate Derivative Suits, 68 VA. L. REv. 1197 (1982). 
80. See, e.g., Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983); 
Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 324 S.E.2d 878 (1985). 
81. 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982). 
82. Cf. Miller, 336 N.W.2d 709 (adopting a comparable procedure). 
83. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-673 to -695. 
84. Id. § 13.1-673(B). 
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roles of the board in large and small corporations. 85 
Revised Statute section 3.1-673(A) states that all corporations 
shall have a board of directors. It does not authorize, as does 
Model Act section 8.01(c), closely held corporations to dispense 
with the board and describe in the articles of incorporation who 
will perform the functions of the board.86 The Revised Statute re-
quires a board for all corporations, but it allows provisions in the 
articles limiting the role of the directors. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-675 clarifies prior law regarding the 
fixing and changing of the number of directors. The number of di-
rectors is to be fixed by the bylaws or, if there is no provision in 
the bylaws, by the articles. Because Revised Statute subsections 
13.1-675(A) and (B) specifically deal with amendment to bylaw 
provisions regarding the size of the board, they ought to prevail 
over Revised Statute section 13.1-714, which deals with amend-
ments to the bylaws generally. 
Pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1-675(B), the sharehold-
ers may adopt a bylaw fixing the number of directors and stating 
that the bylaw cannot be amended by the board of directors. If 
there is no such prohibition, the board may amend the bylaw to 
increase or decrease the number of directors, but by no more than 
thirty percent. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-675(E) provides that no one can be 
elected a director without his prior consent. Although a person 
elected without prior consent could attempt to resign, probably the 
better argument is that he was never validly elected to the board. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-676 recognizes that the articles of 
incorporation may provide for the election of a certain number of 
directors by specified classes of shares. Any class having this right 
is a separate voting group for purposes of the election and removal 
of directors. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-677, regarding the terms of office of 
directors, is consistent with prior Virginia law, except that the 
term of a director elected by the board to fill a vacancy now runs 
only until the next election of directors by the shareholders. Pre vi-
ously such a director would serve the remainder of his predeces-
85. MoDEL Acro, supra note 4, § 8.01 official comment, at 193. 
86. The Model Act's approach is found in the corporation codes of states having optional 
closely held corporation chapters. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (Repl. Vol. 1983). 
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sor's term. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-679 explicitly provides for resigna-
tion by a director. Resignation is effective upon delivery of a writ-
ten notice of resignation to the corporation unless the notice speci-
fies a later effective date. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-680 provides for the removal of di-
rectors. This section allows removal of directors by the sharehold:.. 
ers with or without cause unless the articles of incorporation spe-
cifically state that directors may be removed only for cause. This 
latter point seems to be a change from the Old Statute. Old Stat-
ute section 13.1-42 provided that a director could be removed with 
or without cause; it did not sanction a provision in the articles pro-
viding for removal only for cause. 
The Revised Statute thus clearly makes available a defensive 
anti-takeover amendment. The articles could be amended to pro-
vide that directors can be removed only for cause. Such an amend-
ment would mean that an acquiring party could not take immedi-
ate control of the board by removing the incumbents and replacing 
them with individuals of his choice. This amendment would be a 
deterrent only until the next annual meeting unless coupled with 
an articles provision for staggered terms for directors, as allowed 
by Revised Statute section 13.1-678. 
Removal can take place only at a meeting called for that pur-
pose, and notice of the meeting must state that removal is the pur-
pose, or one of the purposes, of the meeting. 87 Removal can take 
place at either the annual or a special meeting. Notice of purpose 
generally need not be given for the annual meeting;88 however, if 
one of the purposes is to vote on removal of a director, notice of 
this purpose must be given. 
The list in Revised Statute section 13.1-654 of who may demand 
a special meeting is critical in this instance. For the over-thirty-
five-shareholder corporation, only the board, its chairman or the 
president can demand a special meeting unless the articles list ad-
ditional persons.89 For the thirty-five-or-fewer-shareholder corpo-
ration, those same persons or the holders of twenty percent of the 
87. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-680(D). 
88. Id. § 13.1-658(B) states that, unless the articles otherwise provide, notice of purpose 
for the annual meeting need not be given. Section 13.1-658(C) requires that the notice of a 
special meeting state the purpose of the meeting. 
89. Id. § 13.1-655(A)(l). 
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shares entitled to vote may demand a meeting.90 Hence in the 
over-thirty-five-shareholder corporation having no special article 
provision, it is unlikely that removal could take place at a special 
meeting since the persons authorized to call the meeting may be 
sympathetic to the individual whose removal is sought. However, 
removal could take place at the annual meeting. Since the share-
holders have the right to remove directors, they could demand that 
this be included on the agenda for and notice of the meeting. Of 
course, removal at the annual meeting would only be an issue if the 
terms of the board are staggered. 
If a director is elected by a separate voting group, only that vot-
ing group may participate in the vote to remove him.91 At the 
meeting called for removal, unless the corporation employs cumu-
lative voting or unless the articles require a greater percentage, the 
director is removed only if the votes in favor of removal are a ma-
jority of the votes entitled to vote on the motion.92 This is a differ-
ent voting rule than applies elsewhere in the statute, and it is anal-
ogous to the rule governing shareholder approval of significant 
corporate transactions.93 Generally, matters are approved at the 
shareholders' meetings by a majority of the votes cast; election of 
directors is by a plurality of votes cast. Yet, removal requires a 
larger number of votes: a majority of the votes entitled to be cast. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-682 provides for the filling of vacan-
cies on the board, including vacancies arising from an increase in 
the size of the board. Both the shareholders and the remaining di-
rectors, even if they are less than a quorum, may fill vacancies. The 
statute thus provides the maximum opportunity to maintain full 
board membership at little harm to any group. If the shareholders 
disapprove of the person. selected by the board, they can remove 
him, assuming they can demand that a meeting be called to con-
sider removal. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-684 provides that the board may 
permit any member to participate in the meeting by any means of 
communication allowing all members participating to simultane-
ously hear each other. A member participating in the meeting pur-
90. Id. § 13.1-655(A)(2). 
91. Id. § 13.1-GSO(B). 
92. Id. § 13.1-680(C). 
93. See, e.g., infra pp. 117-19, 121-23, 130 for discussion of shareholder voting on amend-
ments to the articles of incorporation, plans of merger or share exchange, sales of all or 
substantially all the assets other than in the ordinary course of business, and dissolutions. 
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suant to this section is deemed to be present at the meeting, 
whether or not physically present. 
The difference between this section and Old Statute section 
13.1-41 is that the Old Statute seemed to allow such participation 
at the option of the director. Revised Statute section 13.1-684, on 
the other hand, provides that "the board . . . may permit" a mem-
ber to participate by conference call. It thus appears that the 
board, presumably by a majority, has the right to decide if a mem-
ber can participate by conference call. The possibility exists that a 
majority of the board could determine that a director not physi-
cally present at the meeting site may not so participate. The Offi-
cial Comment to Model Act section 8.20 states that the directors' 
judgment on this matter is discretionary. It is possible then for one 
faction to eliminate opposition by deciding that only those physi-
cally present may participate in the meeting. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-685 allows the board of directors to 
act by unanimous written consent. Action of the board taken in 
this manner is deemed to be the action of the board as of the date 
the last director signs the consent, unless the consents specify a 
different date. Although action by written consent requires una-
nimity, the consent forms could provide, for example, that the con-
sents constitute action of the board as of the date on which a ma-
jority of the board has signed. 
The Official Comment to Model Act section 8.21, on which this 
section is based, describes the usefulness of written consents. It 
notes that for pub~icly held corporations consents are .especially 
useful when matters require prompt action and are non-controver-
sial. From this statement, an inference ought not be drawn that 
good corporate practice requires that significant corporate matters 
not be acted on by unanimous consent, but only at a meeting. The 
theory of the unanimous consent is that if all the directors are of a 
like mind, a meeting is not necessary.94 
Revised Statute section 13.1-687 governs waiver of notice of a 
meeting. It allows a director to waive notice either before or after 
the meeting. Waiver is effected either in writing or by the direc-
tor's attendance at, or participation in, the meeting. The director 
does not waive notice by attendance or participation if, at the be-
94. There may be little consequence to the comment's distinction between controversial 
and non-controversial matters, however. In reality, if the matter is controversial it is likely 
that a meeting will be necessary because unanimous consent will not be obtainable. 
1985] VIRGINIA STOCK CORPORATION ACT 101 
ginning of the meeting or upon his arrival, he objects to holding 
the meeting or transacting business at it and does not thereafter 
vote for or assent to action taken at the meeting.95 
It seems clear from this language that, in order to preserve this 
objection, the director need not leave the meeting after stating his 
objection. It is less clear whether the objection is preserved if the 
director participates in discussion. The question involves the 
meaning of "participation." Are voting for or assenting to96 action 
the only things destroying the objection? Or is stating a position 
on the issue before the meeting deemed participation? By common 
understanding, the latter is deemed participation. 
The Official Comment to the Model Act states that notice of a 
meeting is a technical requirement and waivers should be permit-
ted freely.97 This statement supports the argument that participa-
tion short of voting or assenting would constitute a waiver. The 
Official Comment states that one who attends did in fact have no-
tice and generally should not be able to raise a technical objection 
to lack of proper notice. It concedes, however, that in some situa-
tions lack of notice can result in actual prejudice, as for instance if 
certain key directors are not present. In these situations, the ob-
jecting director must follow the procedures set forth in the stat-
ute.98 The Model Act seems to add a gloss of "actual prejudice" to 
the statutory language. A director not receiving the requisite notice 
ought to be free, for whatever tactical reason, to object and ought 
not be required to demonstrate "actual prejudice." 
Revised Statute section 13.1-688 establishes the quorum and 
voting rules for directors' meetings. A majority of the number of 
directors, as fixed in the articles or bylaws, is necessary to establish 
a quorum. The articles or bylaws may reduce this percentage, for 
quorum purposes, to as low as one-third. Different rules apply to 
shareholders' meetings. 99 
Revised Statute section 13.1-688(C) states the voting rules for 
95. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-687(B). 
96. Id. § 13.1-688(D) states that a director present at a meeting is deemed to have as-
sented to the action unless he objects, votes against it, or abstains. 
97. MoDEL Ac:r, supra note 4, § 8.23 official comment. 
98. Id. 
99. In contrast, REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-668(A), authorizes supermajority 
quorum provisions for shareholders' meetings only if they are contained in the articles. A 
bylaw provision is not valid. It also allows a greater-than-majority, but not a less-than-ma-
jority, quorum provision. 
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directors' meetings, which differ in two significant aspects from 
those governing shareholders' meetings. First, consistent with 
Levisa Oil Corp. v. Quigley/00 the quorum must be present when-
ever a vote is taken.101 The presence of a quorum at the outset of 
the meeting is not sufficient. Second, approval requires a majority, 
or such higher percentage as the articles or bylaws102 require, of 
the votes present, not of the votes cast, as is the case at sharehold-
ers' meetings. 
Under a provision in Revised Statute section 13.1-688(E), ap-
proval by the board is unnecessary for certain major corporate 
transactions if they have been unanimously approved by the 
shareholders. 
In a separate subsection, Revised Statute section 13.1-688(D) 
states the circumstances in which a director is deemed to have as-
sented to board action. A director present at a meeting is deemed 
to have assented to action at a meeting unless he: (1) objects to the 
holding of the meeting or to the transacting of certain business; (2) 
votes against it; or (3) abstains from voting on the matter. As 
stated in the voting provision of Revised Statute section 13.1-
688(C), abstaining works against passage since passage requires a 
majority of the votes present. It is therefore appropriate that vot-
ing against or abstaining be treated the same for "assenting" 
purposes. 
In contrast, Old Statute section 13.1-44 provided that a director 
was deemed to have assented unless his dissent was entered in the 
record of the meeting or a written dissent was filed before or 
within three days after adjournment of the meeting. Abstention 
without filing a written dissent was deemed assent.103 Under the 
Revised Statute, assent seems to be devoid of any separate mean-
ing and is the same as voting in favor of board action. If a director 
is present at a meeting and does not object to the meeting or trans-
100. 217 Va. 898, 234 S.E.2d 257 (1977). 
101. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-688(C). 
102. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-39, authorized only articles of incorporation provi-
sions increasing the required percentage for board action. 
103. Under the Old Statute, abstaining worked against passage. However, abstaining 
without filing a dissent constituted assent for which a director would be deemed 
accountable. 
MoDEL A~, supra note 4, § 8.24(d), is similar to OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-44. A 
director present at a meeting is deemed to have assented unless he: (1) objects to the meet-
ing or the transaction of specific business at it; (2) dissents or abstains, and this fact is 
entered in the minutes; or (3) delivers a written dissent before or after adjournment. 
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acting of specific business, or votes against it or abstains, what else 
can he have done but voted in favor? 
The Revised Statute thus seems to afford the directors greater 
protection from liability than the Old Statute did, even though the 
liability sections are comparable. For example, both Revised Stat-
ute section 13.1-692 and Old Statute section 13.1-44 impose liabil-
ity on directors voting in favor of, or assenting to, an illegal distri-
bution. Under the Old Statute, a director who simply abstained 
would be liable; he would not be liable under the Revised Statute. 
Moreover, under the Old Statute, the identity of those not liable 
could readily be determined. The procedure set out in Old Statute 
section 13.1-44 required a notice of dissent to be recorded in the 
minutes or filed separately. In either event, the identity of the dis-
senting director would be disclosed. The Revised Statute is less 
specific on this point. Since it does not require written dissents, in 
some circumstances it may be difficult, after the fact, to determine 
who is liable.104 
Revised Statute section 13.1-689 allows the board to create vari-
ous committees, unless otherwise provided in the articles or by-
laws. Such committees are created by the approval of the greater 
of a majority of the directors then in office or of the number of 
directors required by the articles or bylaws to take action under 
Revised Statute section 13.1-688.105 The board may create the 
104. For example, assume seven directors are present at a meeting and a measure is 
passed, four votes in favor and two opposed. If the minutes sinlply reflect the vote, four to 
two, there is no way to know which three directors are not liable. The Old Statute placed 
the onus on the director wishing to avoid liability. The Revised Statute imposes no such 
burden. This is especially a problem since the burden of proof in suits alleging breach of the 
standard of care is on the plaintiff, not on the director. 
105. Section 13.1-688 allows supermajority provisions. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 
13.1-689, is taken from MoDEL A~. supra note 4, § 8.25(b). The Official Comment to § 
8.25(b) explains that it is intended as a supermajority provision and underscores the inlpor-
tance of the decision to create committees and empower them to act on behalf of the board. 
The comment states that the committees are created by "the affirmative vote of a majority 
of the board of directors then in office, or, if greater, by the number of directors required to 
take action by the articles of incorporation or bylaws." This is apparently a reference to a 
supermajority provision in the articles or the bylaws. 
As drafted, however, REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-689(B), is unclear. The arti-
cles may state what percentage of the board is required for quorum or voting purposes. Use 
of the word "number" of directors rather than "percentage" is confusing. There is no way to 
know how many votes are required for a majority, or a supermajority, unless the number 
present at the meeting is also known. One interpretation of the provision is that the ap-
proval of the committee requires the vote of the greater of: (1) a majority of the directors in 
office; or (2) a supermajority, if the articles or bylaws have a supermajority provision. While 
this interpretation clarifies the provision, it makes it unnecessary because it merely restates 
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committees; but their role and responsibilities, subject to the con-
straints of this section, are defined by the articles or bylaws. 
These committees are committees of the board. As such, they 
discharge the responsibilities of the board as stated in Revised 
Statute section 13.1-673. The conduct of a director serving on a 
committee is governed by the same standards that apply to board 
members generally. In no event, however, may a committee ap-
prove or recommend to the shareholders for their approval certain 
significant corporate actions including filling vacancies on the 
board, adopting amendments to the articles or bylaws, authorizing 
certain distributions or issuance of shares, or approving mergers.108 
Revised Statute section 13.1-690 states the general standard of 
conduct to which directors will be held in the discharge of their 
responsibilities. Since the Old Statute contains no comparable pro-
vision, this section imports new statutory material into Virginia 
law. 
The issue of the appropriate standard of conduct for directors 
has been the subject of intense interest in recent years and has 
evoked a plethora of scholarly writing.107 The Model Act has been 
concerned with the topic for quite some time, and the American 
Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance Project has re-
cently dealt with the issue.108 
Given this national concern and the fact that the Revised Stat-
ute has generally closely followed the Model Act, it is extremely 
the usual rule. A provision in the articles establishing a supermajority would prevail over 
the statutory majority voting rule. 
106. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-689(D). 
107. See, e.g., Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 93 
(1979); Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same Harbor But Charted Channel: A Re-
sponse, 35 Bus. LAW. 947 (1980); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoreti-
cal View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099 
(1977); Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Govern-
ance Project: the Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 609 (1984); 
Kennedy, The Standard of Responsibility for Directors, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 624 (1984); 
Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for 
Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1984); Manning, The Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45 
OHIO ST. L.J. 615 (1984); Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Govern-
ance, 30 HAsTINGS L.J. 1353 (1979); Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or 
Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware 
Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919 (1980). 
108. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984 & Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) [hereinafter cited, respectively, as TENT. 
DRAFT No. 3 and TENT. DRAFT No. 4]. 
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significant that the Revised Statute departs radically from the 
Model Act on this fundamental point. Moreover, the Revised Stat-
ute is significantly different from prior Virginia law.109 
As stated in Revised Statute section 13.1-690(A), "[a] director 
shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a 
member of a committee, in accordance with his good faith business 
judgment of the best interests of the corporation." 
In contrast Model Act section 8.30(a) provides that: 
[a] director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his 
duties as a member of a committee: 
(1) in good faith 
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi-
tion would exercise under similar circumstances; and 
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best in-
terest of the corporation. 
Generally speaking, the Model Act adopts a tort-like reasonable 
man standard comprising numerous elements. The director must 
act: (1) in good faith, (2) with the care of an ordinarily prudent 
person (3) in a like position (4) under similar circum-
stances.110 Application of this standard requires the trier of fact 
first to construct a factual background including the time and in-
formation constraints, the makeup of the board, and its role in cor-
porate decision making (the "in like position" and "in similar cir-
cumstances" elements). Next, what the ordinarily prudent person, 
as measured against that factual background, would do with re-
spect to the issue in question must be determined. Finally, the 
trier of fact must decide if the conduct or action of the directors in 
question was consistent with the reasonable man standard. 
Because of the numerous variables and the real, but difficult to 
quantify or articulate, pressures that existed at the time the judg-
ment in question was made, the Model Act standard is difficult to 
construct and apply. These difficulties may result in its not being 
109. See infra notes 112 & 118 and accompanying text. 
110. For a discussion of the components of the Model Act standard, see A.B.A. Commit-
tee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, Corporate Direc-
tor's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1600-04 (1978} ~ addition to the MODEL A~. supra 
note 4, § 8.30 official comment. 
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rigorously used by the courts. Consequently, there is uncertainty as 
to its meaning and viability. It may be hard for directors subject to 
the standard to take it seriously if they cannot understand it or do 
not believe it will be employed. If rigorously applied, it could be 
criticized for holding directors to an unrealistically high 
standard.m 
Prior Virginia case law was more compatible with the general 
approach of the Model Act. Directors were required to exercise 
"the same degree of care ... that men prompted by self-interest 
generally exercise in their own affairs. "112 While these cases did not 
require the construction of the elaborate framework called for by 
the Model Act, they did require the trier of fact to measure the 
conduct in question against an external standard of care. 
In contrast, the standard articulated in Revised Statute section 
13.1-690(A) comprises only two elements. The director must dis-
charge his responsibilities in accordance with (1) his good faith (2) 
business judgment of the best interests of the corporation. This 
standard has the appeal of apparent simplicity. 
It may be a unique statute nationally. This fact, coupled with 
the lack of legislative history, may mean that it will be difficult for 
courts to define its elements and parameters. Some preliminary ob-
servations may be useful in this regard.113 
111. See CoDE CoMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 1, app. 4 at 248. 
TENT. DRAFT No. 4, supra note 108, sets forth a standard of care very similar to the Model 
Act, but it protects business decisions separately under the less rigorous business judgment 
rule, if they are made on an informed basis. This model establishes the reasonable man 
standard for conduct generally. Actual business decisions are not reviewed against that stan-
dard, but rather against the more lenient business judgment rule. 
For a discussion of the earlier, but not substantively different, A.L.I. version of the stan-
dard of care contained in TENT. DRAFT No. 3, supra note 108, see generally Frankel, Corpo-
rate Directors' Duty of Care: The American Law Institute's Project on Corporate Govern-
ance, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 705 (1984); Hinsey, supra note 107, at 609; Kennedy, supra 
note 107, at 624; Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653 (1984). 
112. Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 17, 171 S.E. 501, 506 (1933) (quoting Hun v. Cary, 82 
N.Y. 65, 71 (1880)). The same test was applied in O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors Corp., 
163 Va. 908, 920, 177 S.E. 852, 857 (1935). These cases involved failed banl[S and financial 
institutions. The directors were found liable for not acting as prudent bank or financial 
institution directors. See also Marshall v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Sav.'s Bank, 85 Va. 676, 8 
S.E. 586 (1889). In Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982), 
the court examined the conduct and the conclusion of a special litigation committee and 
found that the committee had acted reasonably and that there was a reasonable basis for its 
conclusion. 
113. See also CoDE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, app. 4, at 248-50. 
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The statute presents two separate, but related, issues. The first 
raises the question whether the statute articulates a standard to 
which directors will be held in the performance of their duties. The 
second involves the substantive content of that standard. 
It is important to recognize that the statute does purport to 
state a standard of conduct to which directors will be held in dis-
charging their duties. The statute is not merely a codification of 
the business judgment rule.114 The business judgment rule protects 
directors from liability for decisions made;115 it does not, however, 
directly establish a standard by which directors are to guide their 
future conduct.116 In the section heading, "[g]eneral standards of 
conduct for directors," and in the introductory phrase, "a director 
shall discharge his duties," Revised Statute Section 13.1-690(A) 
clearly states a standard against which the conduct of the directors 
is to be measured.117 
As a standard, the section applies to directors in discharging 
their duties generally and in making specific decisions or taking 
actions. It thus applies to passive misconduct and inattention to 
duties, as well as to actual misconduct.118 
114. The business judgment rule is most often applied as a presumption in favor of direc-
tors, rather than as an affirmative standard of conduct. See Arsht, supra note 107, at 130-
31. In showing that a defendant director made a decision, plaintiff establishes the fact from 
which the presumption is drawn. The presumption raises the business judgment rule as a 
defense, and the burden shifts to plaintiff to negate it. The court does not attempt to decide 
whether it agrees with the directors; it determines only whether there is a rational basis for 
the decision. Id. at 126. 
115. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Casey v. Woodruff,_ Misc. 2d _, 49 
N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Arsht, supra note 107; Block & Prussin, The Business Judg-
ment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27 (1981). 
116. Indirectly, it certainly does provide a standard. If the directors understand that a 
court will uphold those decisions supported by a rational basis, they will realize the need to 
act rationally in the future. Recently, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the action of directors in approving a merger was not 
entitled to protection under the business judgment rule since it was not an informed deci-
sion. In order for the decision to be an informed one, the directors would have had to inform 
themselves, before acting, of all information reasonably available. Id. at 872; see TENT. 
DRAFT No. 4, supra note 108, § 4.01(c)(2). 
117. Use of the phrase "business judgment" in the statutory language ought not tempt 
courts to conclude that § 13.1-690(A) is merely a codification of the business judgment rule, 
rather than of a standard of conduct. This introductory language is the same as that in the 
Model Act. The Official Comment to MonEL Ar:r, supra note 4, § 8.30, explains that this 
section provides the standard which directors must meet in discharging their 
responsibilities. 
118. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981) (applying the 
Model Act standard to passive conduct). 
The Virginia Supreme Court opinions in O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors Corp., 163 Va. 
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The next question presented is: precisely what is the substantive 
content of this standard applicable to both actual and passive mis-
conduct? The section may present some difficulty regarding this 
question. In an effort to avoid the complication and artificiality of 
the Model Act, the section sets forth a very straightforward stan-
dard. The section is intended to afford directors very broad lati-
tude in the discharge of their duties.119 
There is a risk, however, that in so doing, the standard has been 
substantially diluted. In an effort to avoid measuring the conduct 
or decision in question against any outside or objective standard, 
the drafters did not include the words "reasonable" or "rational 
basis" in the statute. The trier of fact need only find good faith 
and determine whether the conduct in question was a product of 
the director's own business judgment of what is in the best interest 
of the corporation. The director's conduct or decision is not to be 
analyzed in the context of whether a reasonable man would have 
acted similarly. 
As so applied, the standard may be reduced to a purely subjec-
tive inquiry into the director's conduct. If the trier of fact does not 
measure the conduct in question against some external standard, it 
must determine, in hindsight, whether the conduct comported with 
what the trier of fact believes was the director's good faith business 
judgment of the best interest of the corporation. This application 
may encourage directors to take risks necessary to develop the cor-
poration's business without undue concern for liability and may be 
a true advantage of the statute. 
The statute, however, may also protect the utterly inept, but 
well-meaning, good faith director.120 In support of the statute, it 
could be argued that, since the shareholders ultimately own the 
enterprise and elect the directors, there is no need to impose a 
high statutory standard of care on the directors. If some directors 
are well-intentioned but marginal, it is the shareholders' responsi-
bility. They could elect better individuals or replace the inept. 
908, 177 S.E. 852 (1935), and Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 171 S.E. 501 (1933), held the 
directors liable for inattention to their duties. Applying REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 
13.1-690, to inattention or passive misconduct would therefore be consistent with prior case 
law. 
119. See Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: 
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477 (1984). 
120. TENT. DRAFT No. 4, supra note 108, § 4.01 comment f, describes a good faith stan-
dard as one providing too much protection for the directors and officers. It would insulate 
the decision makers from liability for the consequences of objectively irrational conduct. 
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This argument ignores several realities. First, it is the majority, or 
plurality, of the shareholders which elects the directors. Those 
elected are charged with acting in the best interest of the entity 
and of all the shareholders, not only of those who elected them. 
Second, in the large, publicly held corporation, the board, or per-
haps more frequently the dominant executive officers, nominate 
the directors. And their choices are typically ratified overwhelm-
ingly by the shareholders through the proxy process. 
In considering whether the statute does protect the inept but 
well-meaning director, one might consider that rational conduct is 
an element assumed within the standard. The statute requires a 
director to act in what he believes to be the best interests of the 
corporation. The corporation exists as an entity to serve some pur-
pose or achieve some objective or advantage for the shareholders. 
It is difficult to demonstrate that irrational acts are in the best 
interest of the entity or are of any advantage to the entity in 
achieving its purpose. One might thus conclude that only a direc-
tor's rational acts are protected.121 
The remaining sections of Revised Statute section 13.1-690 fol-
low the Model Act fairly closely. In performing his functions, a di-
rector is entitled by section 13.1-690(B) to rely on_ information, 
opinions or reports, including financial information and data pre-
pared by officers, employees, board committees or outside experts, 
so long as the director in good faith believes the individuals to be 
competent. This reliance provision is qualified by the clause 
"[u]nless [the director] has knowledge or information concerning 
the matter ... that makes reliance unwarranted."122 
If the action taken by the director would in fact violate the stan-
dard of care, but the director acted in reliance on others and had 
no reason to doubt the competence of the individual relied upon, 
he will not be liable. However, one possessing knowledge or infor-
mation123 suggesting that the conclusion or opinion of the expert is 
121. Admittedly, this argument ignores the fact that the statute inquires only into the 
director's own assessment of what is in the corporation's best interest. A director who hon-
estly believes that an utterly stupid, irrational act is in the corporation's best interest would 
be protected under a literal reading of the statute. The difficulty a trier of fact would have 
in exone,rating such conduct may provide the impetus to adopt an interpretation of the 
statute allowing inquiry at least into the rationality of the belief, either on the ground sug-
gested or as bearing on the director's good faith. 
122. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-690(B). 
123. Inclusion of this "or information" language means that if a director has available 
information about the matter which would cause reliance to be unwarranted, the defense is 
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unfounded may not avail himself of the reliance defense. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-690(C) states that a director is not 
liable for action taken as a director, or for failure to act, if he per-
formed his duties in conformance with this section. This provision 
establishes the pervasiveness of the standard: the standard is co-
extensive with the directors' duties as defined in the statute, other 
law or the articles. Once the director proves that he has met the 
standard, he is exonerated. The business judgment rule is not to be 
applied separately as grounds on which to review the conduct. 
This provision probably is not intended to insulate directors 
from liability based on theories or causes of action other than the 
standard of care. For example, if a director voted in favor of a 
measure which substantially and inordinately benefited him per-
sonally, compliance with the standard of care probably would not 
preclude a suit based on breach of fiduciary duty.124 
Revised Statute section 13.1-691 deals with director conflicts. Al-
though it does not change the thrust of prior Virginia law, it does 
amplify prior law by some extremely helpful definitional and pro-
cedural provisions. Moreover, it narrows the ambit of the conflict 
of interest rules. Old Statute section 13.1-39.1 applied to both di-
rectors and officers; Revised Statute section 13.1-691 applies only 
to directors. Under the Revised Statute, a transaction in which a 
director has a direct or indirect personal interest is not voidable 
merely because of such interest if any one of the following circum-
stances exists: (1) the material facts surrounding the transaction 
are disclosed, and the transaction is approved or ratified by either 
the board or the shareholders; or (2) the transaction is fair to the 
corporation. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-691(B) defines an indirect interest 
to include material financial interests in an entity which is a party 
to the transaction, or service on the board as an officer or trustee 
of the entity which is a party to the transaction, if the transaction 
has been, or ought to have been, approved by the board of the 
entity. 
Revised Statute sections 13.1-691(C) and (D) set forth special 
voting procedures for board or shareholder approval of conflict of 
unavailable even though the director had no actual knowledge. The director is required to 
act on the information he possesses. 
124. It probably should not, if for no other reason than that the burdens of proof are 
completely different in these two causes of action. 
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interest transactions. These procedures essentially require ap-
proval by a majority of those having no direct or indirect interest 
in the transaction. 
Old Statute section 13.1-39.1 provided that approval by the 
board or shareholders required passage by the requisite majority 
without counting the votes of the interested director. Revised Stat-
ute subsections 13.1-691(C) and (D) are in one sense more liberal 
and in another more rigorous than the Old Statute. They require 
approval only by a majority of the disinterested votes, even if this 
number is less than a majority of all the votes. However, the ap-
proval must be by a majority of all the disinterested votes, not 
merely by the majority at a meeting at which a quorum is present. 
Several additional points regarding section 13.1-691 should be 
noted. First, this section merely provides that transactions meeting 
one of the validation tests are not voidable. The section does not 
mean that such transactions cannot be challenged on other 
grounds, including breach of fiduciary duty by the director in-
volved or breach of the standard of care by the directors in approv-
ing it. 
Second, an uncertainty existing under prior versions of this type 
of provision has not been clarified by this section, nor by Model 
Act section 8.31 on which it is based. For example, if a transaction 
is approved by the directors in compliance with this section, may it 
nonetheless be voidable if it is manifestly unfair to the corpora-
tion? If the section is read literally, the answer is no. If any one of 
the three alternative means of validation is met, the transaction is 
not voidable. Fairness to the corporation is a separate test of vali-
dation; it is not an element in the alternatives providing for ap-
proval by either the directors or shareholders. 
Some courts have read the fairness element into those alterna-
tives.125 As drafted, section 13.1-691 renders an unfair transaction 
approved by the board binding on the corporation. However, the 
corporation in turn may have recourse against the director benefit-
ing from the transaction on breach of fiduciary duty grounds and 
perhaps against the entire board on standard of care or corporate 
waste grounds. 
Finally, this section states nothing about the burden of proof. 
125. See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, __, 
241 P.2d 66, 74-75 (1952). 
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Old Sta~ute section 13.1-39.1, like prior versions of the Model 
Act/26 stated those instances where the common law rule that con-
flict of interest transactions were automatically void, or voidable at 
the option of the corporation, would not apply. The presumption 
was in favor of voidability, especially where the issue involved the 
fairness of the transaction. The burden of proving that the con-
tract was binding on the corporation fell on the party seeking to 
uphold it, the interested director. 
The approach of the Old Statute was consistent with the corpo-
rate law principle that the corporate fiduciary bears the burden of 
proving compliance with his duties. While section 13.1-691 is silent 
on the burden of proof issue, there is no reason to believe that a 
change in the common law burden of proof rule is intended.127 
Revised Statute section 13.1-692 imposes personal liability on di-
rectors voting for or assenting to distributions made in violation of 
the statute unless the director complies with the standard of care 
set forth in Revised Statute section 13.1-690. Given the latitude of 
the standard of care, and the discretion provided the directors by 
Revised Statute section 13.1-653(D) to use financial statements 
prepared on various bases in determining allowable distributions, 
the liability imposed by this section may be minimal. The reliance 
defense is especially important in this setting, given the sophisti-
cated judgments required by the equity solvency test.128 In the ab-
sence of knowledge or information, the directors may rely on the 
judgment of others as to the impact of the distribution on the cor-
poration's solvency. 
Revised Statute se9tion 13.1-692 is consistent with Old Statute 
section 13.1-44 in limiting liability to the illegal amount of the dis-
tribution only; and the liability is to the corporation and its credi-
tors. A director found liable is entitled to contribution from all 
other directors voting for or assenting to the distribution without 
complying with the standard of care and from all shareholders re-
126. See generally Larson, Corporate Conflicts of Interest under the Virginia Stock Cor-
poration Act, 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 463 (1975) (discussing OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-
39.1); Pinto & Bulbulia, Statutory Responses to Interested Director Transactions: A Wa-
tering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201 (1977). 
127. This statute, which is silent on the point, replaces one explicitly providing for a bur-
den of proof. One could argue, then, that there must have been a legislative intent to change 
the burden. However, REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-691, is largely an enactment of 
MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 8.31; and there is no evidence that the Model Act intended to 
change the common law on this point. 
128. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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ceiving the distribution. 
Model Act section 8.33(b)(2) limits the contribution right against 
the shareholders to those knowing that the distribution is made in 
violation of the statute. Revised Statute section 13.1-692, like Old 
Statute section 13.1-44, makes no such distinction. Accordingly, all 
shareholders receiving the distribution are liable in proportion to 
the amount they received.129 
Revised Statute section 13.1-692(C) provides a two-year statute 
of limitations on suits against directors. The outside time limit on 
the shareholders' obligation would be somewhat longer than two 
years. Section 13.1-692(C) does not allow the corporation to pursue 
the shareholders. The corporation or its creditors may sue the di-
rectors to recover the illegal portion of the distribution. The direc-
tors, if found liable, may seek contribution from all shareholders 
receiving the distribution. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-693 requires that every corporation 
have at least a president and a secretary, together with such other 
officers as are described in the bylaws. The same person may si-
multaneously hold more than one office, including those of presi-
dent and secretary. 
The section sets forth a statutory responsibility for only one of-
fice, that of secretary. He shall have responsibility for preparing 
and maintaining custody of the minutes of directors' and share-
holders' meetings and for authenticating corporate records. Under 
Revised Statute section 13.1-694, other officers shall perform the 
duties set forth in the bylaws, or prescribed by the directors con-
sistent with the bylaws or by other officers authorized to do so by 
the board. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-695 provides for the resignation and 
removal of officers. An officer may resign at any time. He may also 
be removed at any time, with or without cause, by the board or by 
the officer who appointed him. This section does not incorporate 
the provision of Model Act section 8.44 which states that removal 
does not affect the officers' contract rights. Resolution of removed 
officers' contract rights is thus left to contract law. 
The Revised Statute does not adopt Model Act section 8.42, the 
129. The theory is that all shareholders received something to which they were not enti-
tled. There is, however, the potential for harm to unknowing shareholders who may have 
spent the distribution long before they were called upon for contribution. 
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standard of conduct for officers. It contains no provision on this 
point. Consequently the common law will continue to apply. 
I. Article Ten-Indemnification180 
Article Ten contains the indemnification provisions. Because of 
the complexity and integration of these provisions, it is not practi-
cal to consider each one separately. It is more feasible to discuss 
the right of indemnification generally. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-696 contains some helpful defini-
tions to be used in Article Ten. Section 13.1-697 authorizes the 
corporation to indemnify an individual serving as a director if cer-
tain conditions are met. Section 13.1-698 states instances in which 
the corporation must indemnify. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-697 provides that an individual, 
serving as a director, who is a party to a proceeding131 may be in-
demnified if he acted in good faith and: (1) if acting in his official 
capacity, he believed that his conduct was in the best interest of 
the corporation; (2) if not acting in his official capacity, he believed 
that his conduct was at least not opposed to the corporation's best 
interest; or (3) if in a criminal proceeding, he had at least a reason-
able belief that his conduct was not unlawful. A separate standard 
is applied to individuals sued as a result of their conduct with re-
spect to an employee benefit plan. 
This section prohibits indemnification by the corporation in con-
nection with proceedings brought by, or in the right of, the corpo-
ration, where the individual has been found liable to the corpora-
tion. Indemnification is also prohibited in suits where the 
individual was found to have improperly received a personal bene-
fit. Old Statute section 13.1-3.1, in contrast, narrowly authorized 
corporate indemnification for expenses in instances where the di-
rector was found liable for negligence or misconduct in perform-
ance of his duties if a court found that, liability notwithstanding, 
such person was fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification. 
Indemnification in these circumstances may be sought under the 
court-ordered indemnification provisions of Revised Statute sec-
tion 13.1-700. 
130. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-696 to -704. 
131. A proceeding is broadly defined, id. § 13.1-696, to include threatened, pending or 
completed civil, criminal, administrative or investigative action whether formal or informal. 
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Article Ten provides two types of indemnification, mandatory 
and discretionary. Revised Statute section 13.1-698 confers a 
mandatory right of indemnification in limited circumstances. 
Under section 13.1-698, the corporation must indemnify against 
expenses a director who "entirely prevails" in the proceeding. This 
section does allow, however, a provision in the articles of incorpo-
ration modifying or eliminating the right to indemnification. 
The "entirely prevails" language is intended to limit the statu-
tory indemnification right to instances where the proceeding was 
concluded without a finding of liability. It thereby avoids the argu-
ment that a person who successfully defends some counts, but not 
others, is entitled to at least partial indemnification.132 
Discretionary indemnification is more common than the 
mandatory right. In order to obtain discretionary indemnification 
pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1-697, two separate judg-
ments must be made. First, a determination must be made that 
the individual is entitled to be indemnified. This determination is 
made pursuant to either the general determination procedures in 
section 13.1-701 or to the separate court-ordered indemnification 
procedures of section 13.1-700. 
The individual seeking indemnification must demonstrate in this 
phase that indemnification is permissible because the criteria of 
Revised Statute section 13.1-697 have been met.133 The determina-
tion is made in one of several ways: (1) by a majority vote of a 
quorum consisting of directors not parties to the proceeding; (2) if 
a quorum cannot be obtained, by a majority vote of a special com-
mittee consisting of directors not at the time parties to the pro-
ceeding; (3) by legal counsel; or (4) by a vote of the shareholders 
(not counting the shares owned by or voted under control of direc-
tors who are at the time parties to the proceeding).134 
Mter the determination that indemnification is permissible, the 
authorization of the amount of indemnification must be made, gen-
erally by the same body that made the determination.135 In making 
this authorization, it is appropriate for that body to consider, in 
addition to the reasonableness of the request, the ability of the 
132. MonEL Acr:, supra note 4, § 8.52 official comment; see Merritt-Chapman & Scott 
Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974). 
133. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-701(A) & (B). 
134. Id. § 13.1-701(B). 
135. Id. § 13.1-701(C). 
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corporation to pay the amount requested and whether the corpora-
tion's financial resources ought to be devoted to this or some other 
purpose. 136 
Unless limited by the articles, the individual has the right, under 
Revised Statute section 13.1-700, to apply to the court conducting 
the proceeding, or to another court having jurisdiction, for indem-
nification. This right to apply for a judicial determination of in-
demnification exists in two instances. First, it is a means of enforc-
ing the mandatory right of indemnification conferred by Revised 
Statute section 13.1-698. Second, it is the only means by which an 
individual found liable to the corporation in a derivative suit may 
apply for indemnification. Section 13.1-700 allows a court to deter-
mine whether, despite liability, indemnification against expenses 
would be reasonable under the circumstances. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-699 authorizes a corporation to pay 
or reimburse reasonable expenses before final disposition of the 
proceeding. In order to be eligible for such an advance, the individ-
ual must state in writing his good faith belief that he meets the 
criteria for indemnification set forth in Revised Statute section 
13.1-697. He must also undertake to repay the advance if it is later 
determined that indemnification is not appropriate.137 
Officers, employees and agents are entitled by Revised Statute 
section 13.1-702 to the same rights of indemnification as directors. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-703 authorizes a corporation to 
maintain insurance against liability on behalf of its directors, of-
ficers, employees and agents. This right is not substantively lim-
ited by the statutory indemnification provisions. A corporation 
may thus provide insurance coverage broader than the indemnifi-
cation right. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-704(A) states that, unless the arti-
cles or bylaws explicitly so provide, any article or bylaw provision 
regarding indemnification does not supplant the statutory right. 
Moreover, section 13.1-704(B) allows a corporation to confer in-
demnification rights in addition to, or broader than, those con-
tained in Article Ten by a provision in the articles, in any bylaw 
made by the shareholders, or in a resolution of the shareholders. 
136. MODEL Acr, supra note 4, § 8.55 official comment. 
137. This undertaking need not be secured, and the corporation need not determine the 
individual's financial ability to repay before advancing expenses. 
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No indemnification may be provided, however, which would relieve 
individuals from liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
J. Article Eleven-Amendment of Articles of Incorporation and 
Bylaws138 
Article Eleven collects in one place the provisions regarding 
amendment of the articles of incorporation and bylaws. 
Revised Statute 13.1-705(A) states the general proposition that a 
corporation may amend its articles to add or omit any provision 
that could originally be contained in, or omitted from, the articles. 
Section 13.1-705(B) reinforces this right by stating that sharehold-
ers have no vested property rights as a consequence of any provi-
sion in the articles. Of course, amendments to the articles may al-
ter shareholder expectations; but shares are held subject to this 
possibility, and any change to the articles must receive the consent 
of a substantial portion of the shares. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-706 lists certain routine amend-
ments which may be effected by the board without shareholder ap-
proval. These amendments include deletion of the names and ad-
dresses of the initial directors and registered agent and 
accomplishment of a stock-split if only one class of shares is 
outstanding. 
The usual procedure for approval of amendments is contained in 
Revised Statute section 13.1-707. The board may propose amend-
ments to the articles for submission to the shareholders.139 Under 
section 13.1-707(B), the submission of an amendment to the share-
holders should generally be accompanied by a recommendation of 
the board that it be approved by the shareholders. However, the 
board may submit the proposed amendment without recommenda-
138. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-705 to -715. 
139. The statute does not specifically state that the board shall first approve the amend-
ment and then propose it to the shareholders. The sections governing other significant cor-
porate events, such as mergers, share exchanges, asset sales and dissolution, explicitly re-
quire board approval. Approval is certainly implicit in the notion that the board proposes 
the amendment, however. MoDEL Ar:r, supra note 4, § 10.03 official comment, clearly states 
that the procedure for adoption of amendments is that they be approved by the sharehold-
ers after approval by the board. It is probably inappropriate for the shareholders to demand 
a special meeting to vote on a proposed amendment which has not been previously approved 
by the board since they do not have the right to initiate an amendment. However, it proba-
bly would be appropriate for the shareholders to demand a meeting for the purpose of re-
questing that the board consider and approve the proposed amendment and then submit it 
to the shareholders. 
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tion if it determines that, because of conficts of interest or other 
circumstances, a recommendation is not appropriate. 
Under Revised Statute section 13.1-707(C), the board is allowed 
to condition its submission of an amendment on any basis. This is 
an extremely important provision. Through it, the board, in its dis-
cretion, can alter the usual voting rights of the shareholders as 
stated in the articles. For example, if an amendment would benefit 
a certain group of shares not constituting a separate voting group, 
the board could condition its submission of the amendment on ap-
proval by a certain percentage of the votes of all other shares. 
All shareholders, whether or not entitled to vote, are to be given 
notice of the meeting at which a proposed amendment is to be con-
sidered. The notice shall state that one purpose of the meeting is 
to consider the amendment140 and shall be accompanied by the 
text of the amendment. 
At the meeting, the amendment must be approved by more than 
two thirds of the votes of each voting group entitled to vote on it. 
This provision is consistent with Old Statute section 13.1-56. Al-
though the normal quorum rule of a majority of the shares entitled 
to vote applies, approval requires a much higher number (more 
than two thirds of the shares entitled to vote, not of the votes pre-
sent).141 The articles can require a greater or lesser percentage, but 
in no event less than a simple majority of the votes cast. The direc-
tors, pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1-707(C), could re-
quire a greater percentage for approval than stated in the articles 
or statute by so conditioning their submission. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-708 provides for approval of the 
proposed amendment by the separate voting groups in certain cir-
cumstances. Like Old Statute section 13.1-57, it provides that the 
proposed amendment be approved by the requisite percentage of 
shares in each voting group, voting separately. This is true even 
140. This notice of purpose is necessary even if the meeting is the annual meeting which 
generally does not require notice of purpose. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1·658(B). 
141. MODEL A~. supra note 4, § 10.03, likewise requires approval of a majority of the 
shares entitled to vote. The very high vote requirement in the Revised Statute may be a 
mixed blessing in the takeover context. It means that any amendment, including any anti-
takeover defensive amendment, requires this very high vote. On the other hand, this same 
rule applies to mergers, share exchanges, and sales of assets. Consequently, acquisition pro-
posals unacceptable to relatively fewer shareholders, somewhat less than one-third of the 
shares, cannot be effected. Some of these transactions would also require approval 'under 
Article 14, Affiliated Transactions. See REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-725 to -728. 
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though the shares are not generally voting shares if the amend-
ment affects those shares in any one of nine ways, including chang-
ing the designations or rights of the shares, 142 limiting or denying 
preemptive rights, and canceling or limiting rights to accrued 
distributions. 
After approval by the shareholders, the corporation files articles 
of amendment with the Commission, pursuant to Revised Statute 
section 13.1-710. The corporation must include, among other 
things, the text of the amendment and indicate the number of 
votes, by voting group, cast in favor of and against its adoption, or 
state that the number of votes in favor was sufficient to constitute 
approval. Thereafter, the Commission will issue the certificate of 
amendment. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-711 allows the board, with or with-
out shareholder approval, to restate the articles of incorporation. 
This process allows the corporation to integrate its articles, includ-
ing in their proper place all amendments previously approved and 
eliminating the provisions replaced by those amendments. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-714 establishes a more orderly pro-
cedure for amending the bylaws than that which existed under Old 
Statute section 13.1-24. The substance of the old section is not 
changed, however.143 
Section 13.1-714 acknowledges the general proposition that the 
board and the shareholders have concurrent power to amend the 
bylaws. The power of the board in this regard may be limited in 
two ways. First, the articles of incorporation may reserve the power 
exclusively to the shareholders. If this reservation is not contained 
in the initial articles, it could be added only by an amendment to 
the articles, which, of course, would require board approval. The 
second way of limiting the board's prerogative may be more effec-
tive. The shareholders, when amending or adopting a particular 
bylaw, may expressly provide that it not be amended or repealed 
by the board. If neither of these two strictures is imposed, the 
board may amend or repeal a bylaw adopted by the shareholders, 
142. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-57(d), required that such a change be adverse 
before separate class voting was triggered. 
143. See Levisa Oil Corp. v. Quigley, 217 Va. 898, 234 S.E.2d 257 (1977) (holding that 
OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-24, prohibits directors from overriding bylaw provisions 
setting quorum for shareholders' meeting); Scott County Tobacco Warehouses v. Harris, 214 
Va. 508, 201 S.E.2d 780 (1974) (under OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-24, power to 
amend bylaws granted to directors unless reserved to shareholders). 
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and vice versa. 
Bylaws establishing supermajorities for quorum or voting pur-
poses at board meetings are dealt with separately in Revised Stat-
ute section 13.1-715. If such a provision is originally contained in a 
bylaw adopted by the shareholders, only the shareholders can 
change it, even though the explicit statement of shareholder exclu-
sivity required by Revised Statute section 13.1-714 is not made. If 
the provision is initially adopted by the board, either the board or 
the shareholders may change it. 
K. Article Twelve-Merger and Share Exchange144 
Article Twelve, dealing with mergers and share exchanges, does 
not differ significantly from the Old Statute. 
Revised Statute sections 13.1-716 and -717 authorize mergers 
and share exchanges and set forth the procedures for accomplish-
ing them substantially on the same terms as did Old Statute sec-
tions 13.1-68 and -69.1. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-716(B)(3) requires that the plan of 
merger state the manner of converting shares of the constituent 
corporation into either shares or securities of the surviving or other 
corporation, or into cash or property. Thus, cash mergers, having 
the effect of eliminating some shareholders from the enterprise, 
continue to be permitted. This section does not address the ques-
tion whether such mergers are fair to the "frozen out" sharehold-
ers; it merely allows the transaction if it can be effected consistent 
with other obligations to those shareholders. 
The Revised Statute does not expressly allow different treat-
ment of shares of the same class. The Official Comment to Model 
Act section 11.01 states that it is permissible under this provision 
to distinguish among shareholders even of a single class or voting 
group. Under this interpretation, the plan of merger could provide 
that soine shareholders accept cash while others are given securi-
ties or other property. 
Section 13.1-716 does not provide for consolidation. The notion 
of a consolidation seems redundant and therefore is not carried 
over into the Revised Statute. Typically, it is advantageous for one 
of the merger partners to survive. If survival of one constituent is 
144. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-716 to -722. 
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not desired, as perhaps in the case of the combination of two inde-
pendent corporations of relatively the same size, the functional 
equivalent of a consolidation could be achieved by having the con-
stituents form a new corporation and then merging each consti-
tutent into it. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-717, dealing with share exchanges, 
is very similar to Old Statute section 13.1-69.1 which was adopted 
in 1975. In an exchange, shares of one corporation are directly ex-
changed for shares or securities of the other corporation or for 
cash. The transaction is subject to the same safeguards as a statu-
tory merger, such as shareholder approval and dissenters' rights. It 
is a procedure whereby one entity may become the subsidiary of 
another without the awkward process of a reverse triangular 
merger.1415 
Revised Statute section 13.1-718 sets out the procedures 
whereby the shareholders may adopt a plan of merger or share ex-
change. It is the same procedure as governs shareholder approval 
of amendments to the articles of incorporation. After approval by 
the board, the plan of merger or share exchange is submitted to 
the shareholders entitled to vote on it. The plan must be approved 
by the affirmative vote of more than two thirds of the shares enti-
tled to vote on it. The articles may increase this percentage or re-
duce it to not less than a majority of votes cast. 
The plan of merger or exchange must be approved by separate 
voting groups, even if the shares are not otherwise voting shares, if 
the plan contains provisions which, if contained in a proposed arti-
cles amendment, would trigger separate voting. Again, the board 
generally should submit the proposal to the shareholders along 
with its recommendation except in conflict of interest situations or 
145. In a reverse triangular merger, the acquiring corporation forms a wholly owned sub-
sidiary, providing it with cash or securities. The subsidiary is merged into the acquired cor-
poration, and the plan of merger provides that the shareholders of the acquired corporation 
(nominally the surviving entity) receive cash or the securities of the parent in exchange for 
their stock. Through this procedure, the acquired corporation does not cease to exist, but 
becomes a subsidiary of the acquiror. 
The language of some merger statutes may not allow this procedure since the shareholders 
of the surviving corporation lose their status as such. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-
68(c), allowed, and REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-716, allows reverse triangular 
mergers. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-68(c), provided that the manner or basis of 
converting the shares of each merging corporation into shares of the survivor or shares or 
securities of any other corporation be stated in the plan of merger. The italicized language 
allowed the reverse triangular merger. It is carried over into the Revised Statute. 
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other special circumstances. The board may condition its submis-
sion on any basis.146 
There are some significant differences between this section and 
Old Statute section 13.1-68. Revised Statute section 13.1-718(G)(3) 
provides that a plan of merger need not be approved by the share-
holders of the surviving corporation if certain criteria are met. 
First, the articles of the surviving corporation may not differ from 
its articles before the merger. Second, the shareholders in the sur-
viving corporation must hold the same number of identical shares 
as they held before the merger. Finally, the shares issued or issua-
ble as a result of the merger must not increase the number of vot-
ing or participating shares by more than twenty percent. 
Although this provision enables a corporation to avoid calling a 
shareholders' meeting to approve a fairly insignificant merger, it 
may be of limited importance. A surviving entity wishing to avoid 
a shareholders' meeting can, as it could previously, simply form a 
wholly owned subsidiary and merge the other entity into it. While 
this procedure requires the acquiring party to hold a shareholder 
meeting, the meeting is of the sole shareholder of the wholly owned 
subsidiary. 
Under Revised Statute section 13.1-718(1), the board of each 
corporation may approve amendments to the plan of merger or 
share exchange without resubmission to the shareholders. These 
amendments may not change the amount or type of consideration 
the shareholders will receive in exchange for their shares, or 
change any term of the plan which would adversely affect any 
shares of the corporation. 
The short-form merger provision has been carried over in Re-
vised Statute section 13.1-719, but this section is more flexible 
than Old Statute section 13.1-76. A domestic or foreign corporation 
owning at least ninety percent of the outstanding shares of each 
class of a subsidiary's shares may merge the subsidiary into the 
parent without approval of the shareholders of either 
corporation.147 
146. If corporation A owns 60% of corporation B's shares and desires to merge B into 
itself, the board of B could condition its submission of the merger on approval by a majority 
of the 40% minority interest. Under the Revised Statute, only more than two thirds of all 
the voting shares, including A's 60%, would be required. The separate voting rules of Article 
14, Affiliated Transactions, might also apply to this example. See REVISED STATUTE, supra 
note 1, § 13.1-726. 
147. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-719, does not allow merger of the subsidiary 
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Under the Revised Statute, a Virginia domestic subsidiary could 
be merged into a foreign parent if the law of the parent's state of 
incorporation allows the short-form merger. Old Statute section 
13.1-76 only allowed Virginia domestic parent corporations to be 
parties to short-form mergers. 
Under the short-form merger statute, the board of the parent 
must approve the plan of merger and send a copy of it to each 
shareholder of the subsidiary unless the shareholder waives this 
right in writing. After adoption of the plan, the merger is effected 
like any other. 
L. Article Thirteen-Sale of Assets148 
Article Thirteen, dealing with the sale of assets, is not signifi-
cantly different from prior Virginia law. Revised Statute section 
· 13.1-723 authorizes sales, leases and exchanges of all or substan-
tially all of a corporation's assets in the regular course of business 
to be concluded on the terms and conditions established by the 
board. It also, and separately, authorizes the mortgage or encum-
brance of all or substantially all the assets for whatever purpose, 
again on the terms and conditions acceptable to the board. Old 
Statute section 13.1-73 allowed mortgages and encumbrances only 
for the purpose of borrowing money. 
The Official Comment to Model Act section 12.01, on which this 
section is based, notes that the words "substantially all" are to 
mean "nearly all." This seems to be a quantitative test. "All or 
substantially all" is determined by the percentage of assets sold, 
and it must ·be a very high percentage. However, the Official Com-
ment adds a qualitative aspect. It notes that the sale of all assets, 
other than cash or near-cash, is a sale of all or substantially all the 
assets. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-724 governs sales of all or substan-
tially all assets other than in the ordinary course of business. The 
procedure for approving such sales is virtually the same as that for 
approving amendments to the articles of incorporation, or plans of 
merger or share exchanges. This section app~ies to the transfer of 
assets regardless of the character of the transferee. The section 
must be complied with even if the corporation seeks to transfer all 
into another wholly owned subsidiary, but only into the parent. 
148. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-723 to -724. 
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or substantially all its assets not in the ordinary course of business 
to a wholly owned subsidiary.149 If the transfer fits within the defi-
nition of a distribution, it is governed not by this section, but by 
Revised Statute section 13.1-653. 
M. Article Fourteen-Affiliated Transactions150 
Article Fourteen is a discrete set of provisions dealing with 
transactions between the corporation and a potentially dominant 
shareholder. This article became effective in June, 1985, and has 
no analog in the Model Act. 
Article Fourteen was prompted by two motives, one a bit more 
altruistic than the other. First, there was a growing concern about 
the unfairness to minority shareholders resulting from corporate 
transactions with a controlling shareholder. By reason of his share 
ownership and resulting control of the board, a majority share-
holder could fix the terms of the transaction and assure its ap-
proval to the possible detriment of the minority. The second motive 
was the desire to protect Virginia corporations from certain take-
over tactics. 151 
149. MonEL Acr, supra note 4, § 12.01, considers transfers to a wholly owned subsidiary 
like a transfer in the ordinary course of business and therefore does not require shareholder 
approval. This approach has some logical appeal since the assets are not transferred out of 
the enterprise which the shareholders ultimately control. 
The Revised Statute requires shareholder approval for this transaction. Even though the 
wholly owned subsidiary (transferee) is controlled by the parent and indirectly by the share-
holders, the assets are owned after the transfer by a different entity with its own legal re-
sponsibilities. The assets may be subject to different encumbrances; the financial position 
and makeup of the transferor's business, which determine the legalilty of a distribution by 
the parent to its shareholders, would likewise be different. 
150. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-725 to -728. 
151. Article 14 is Virginia's response to these concerns. Other states recently have 
adopted legislation to deal with the same concerns. See, e.g., Mn. CoRPS. & Ass'Ns ConE 
ANN. §§ 3-202, -601 to -603 (Repl. Vol. 1985); OHIO REv. ConE ANN. §§ 1701.01, 1701.831 
(Baldwin Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 408, 409.1, 910 (Purdon 1983). Some of this 
legislation is in response to Edger v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), in which the Illinois 
anti-takeover statute was held unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce. 
See Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act II, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 108 
(1983); Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legislation, 43 
Mn. L. REv. 266 (1984); Steinberg, State Law Developments: The Pennsylvania Anti-Take-
over Legislation, 12 SEc. REG. L.J. 184 (1984). See generally Carney, Shareholder Coordina-
tion Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 
1983 AM. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 341; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Lowenstein, 
Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 249 
(1983). 
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This article comprises several integrated provisions, including a 
very refined set of definitions. These definitions render a detailed 
explanation of the article difficult. Consequently, the following dis-
cussion is general. 
Under Revised Statute section 13.1-725, the holder, directly or 
beneficially, of more than ten percent of the outstanding voting 
shares of a corporation is deemed to be an "interested share-
holder." An interested shareholder can be an individual, corpora-
tion or other holder. The term does not include the corporation 
itself, any of its subsidiaries, or any of the corporation's various 
employee stock ownership or benefit plans. 
Certain significant corporate transactions between the corpora-
tion and the interested shareholder are "affiliated transactions." 
These corporate transactions include mergers, share exchanges, 
sales not in the ordinary course of business of assets having a fair 
market value of more than five percent of the corporation's assets, 
guarantees of indebtedness of the interested shareholder if in an 
amount more than five percent of the corporation's assets, sales of 
any voting shares having an aggregate fair market value in excess 
of five percent of the fair market value of all outstanding voting 
shares, and dissolution. 
The article sets forth two correlative provisions. The first states 
a general rule governing the approval of affiliated transactions, and 
the second, a series of exemptions from that stringent rule. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-726 establishes the general rule that 
affiliated transactions must be approved by the affirmative vote of 
two thirds of the voting shares other than the shares owned by the 
interested shareholder. This voting rule is in addition to, not in 
lieu of, the other voting provisions in the statute or articles. This 
separate voting rule tends to protect minority shareholders since a 
very sizable percentage of the minority must approve the transac-
tion before it can be concluded.152 
The voting rule also discourages hostile takeovers. Of course, the 
article does not apply to the tender offer itself; but it would apply 
to the second phase of the acquisition, such as a merger. Regard-
less of the percentage of voting shares owned by the acquiror, the 
152. If this article applied to the merger example in footnote 146, the transaction would 
require approval of more than two thirds of the shares entitled to vote, pursuant to REVISED 
STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-718, and two thirds of the disinterested 40%, pursuant to 
REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-726. 
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second phase would require the approval of a substantial majority 
of those shares other than the acquiror's. An acquiror may be dis-
couraged from making the initial tender offer if he realizes that he 
may not be able to acquire one hundred percent of the entity. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-727 contains a series of exemptions 
from the separate voting rule. As a result, the voting rule does not 
apply if: (1) the corporation has three hundred or fewer sharehold-
ers;153 (2) the transaction has been approved by a majority of the 
disinterested directors;154 or (3) the interested shareholder owns 
ninety percent of the voting stock or has owned at least eighty per-
cent for five years. 
A separate, and extremely technical, exemption is the "fair 
price" provision of Revised Statute section 13.1-727(6). In general, 
this provision exempts from the separate voting rule affiliated 
transactions in which the shareholders receive "fair value" for their 
shares. Fair value is determined by a series of calculations which 
are drafted to ensure that all shareholders receive the higher of the 
following for their shares: (1) the same dollar value as the inter-
ested shareholder paid for other shares of the same class during a 
two-year period; or (2) the fair value of the shares on the date the 
proposed transaction is announced to the public. 155 
Article Fourteen will apply unless a contrary amendment to the 
articles is adopted. Any such amendment must be approved by two 
thirds of the voting shares other than those owned by any inter-
ested shareholder. 
153. The provision exempts affiliated transactions from the special voting rule of REVISED 
STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-726, if there were not more than 300 shareholders at any time 
during the three years before the announcement. Therefore, if the corporation had partially 
"gone private" within that time, with the result that there were fewer than 300 sharehold-
ers, this exemption would not be available. 
154. Consequently, a "friendly" acquisition through tender offer and merger, or merger 
alone, approved by the requisite percentage of disinterested directors, escapes the special 
voting rule of REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-726. 
155. This "fair price" amendment is designed to protect Virginia corporations from front-
loaded, two-tier takeovers. In such takeovers, the acquiror typically makes a cash tender 
offer for a stated number of the target's shares (sufficient to give the acquiror control, per-
haps 51%) and states its intent to follow up the tender offer with a merger in which the 
remaining shares may receive substantially less consideration than the first group. This ap-
proach is intended to have a stampede effect, assuring the acquiror of obtaining 51%. It 
enables the acquiror to conclude the acquisition at a lesser overall cost than if all shares 
received the same consideration as that provided the first 51%. See Scriggins & Clarke, 
supra note 151, at 266-67. This fair price amendment is similar to the Maryland statute. See 
supra note 151. 
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It is important to note that Article Fourteen applies to all Vir-
ginia corporations, not only to large, publicly held corporations. 
The exemption for three-hundred-or-fewer-shareholder corpora-
tions only exempts them from the separate voting procedure of Re-
vised Statute section 13.1-726. The article therefore serves as a 
guide, even for the small corporation, to what affiliated transac-
tions are and how the corporation and shareholders can deal with 
them.1116 
N. Article Fifteen-Dissenters' Rightsm 
Article Fifteen contains the appraisal procedures. In the past, 
the issue of appraisal rights has evoked two principal criticisms. 
First, from the perspective of a dissenting shareholder, the pro-
ceeding was thought to be highly technical, expensive and risky. 
Second, corporate management argued that the procedure was 
fraught with the potential for nuisance suits.1118 The Model Act 
identifies two competing interests which its dissenters' rights pro-
visions attempt to accommodate.1119 Management must have the 
right to enter new lines of business and to readjust the rights of 
some or all of the shares in order to accomplish legitimate corpo-
rate goals. On the other hand, shareholders opposing management 
and shareholder majority decisions ought to have some means of 
withdrawing from the enterprise with the fair value of their shares. 
This latter point is especially critical in the closely held corpora-
tion setting, where there is no ready market for the shares.160 
The Revised Statute and the Model Act attempt to address 
these concerns by redesigning the concept of dissenters' rights. The 
provisions in Article Fifteen establish a procedure for judicial ap-
praisal of value. This procedure is the final, but hopefully unneces-
156. For example, the board can condition its submission of merger or sale of asset pro-
posals on affirmative approval on the terms required by REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 
13.1-726. 
157. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-729 to -741. 
158. See generally MODEL Ar:r, supra note 4, ch. 13 introductory comment; Committee on 
Corporation Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Asso-
ciation, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights, 32 
Bus. LAW. 1855 (1977); Conard, Amendments of Model Business Corporation Act Affecting 
Dissenters' Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80 and 81), 33 Bus. LAw. 2587 (1978). 
159. MoDEL Ar:r, supra note 4, ch. 13 introductory comment, at 316-17. 
160. A dissenting shareholder in a closely held corporation cannot exercise the "Wall 
Street exception" and simply sell his shares for what the market perceives to be their fair 
value. 
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sary, method of determining fair value. The article is structured so 
as to encourage a mutually acceptable determination of fair value 
without judicial intervention. It is believed that this new procedure 
will be more expeditious and less expensive than the prior system 
of appraisal. The procedure is still, however, very precise with nu-
merous specific requirements and timing provisions. Failure to 
meet the deadlines, or to follow the procedure exactly, terminates 
the shareholder's ability to receive payment for his shares pursu-
ant to this article. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-730(A) states that a shareholder has 
a right to dissent and obtain payment of fair value for his shares in 
four corporate transactions: (1) consummation of a plan of merger 
requiring shareholder approval if the shareholder is entitled to 
vote on the merger or is a shareholder of the constituent corpora-
tion to a short-form merger; (2) consummation of a plan of share 
exchange if the shareholder is a shareholder in the acquired corpo-
ration and is entitled to vote on the plan; (3) sale of substantially 
all the assets of the corporation other than in the ordinary course 
of business if the shareholder is entitled to vote on the proposed 
sale, unless the sale is pursuant to court order or is for cash fol-
lowed within a year by a distribution of the cash to the sharehold-
ers; and (4) any other transaction for which the articles, bylaws or 
a resolution of the board provide dissenters' rights. 
A beneficial owner of shares can exercise the dissenters' rights 
conferred by this article if he submits to the corporation the record 
owner's written consent to the dissent. 
A "Wall Street exception" is contained in Revised Statute sec-
tion 13.1-730(C). Unless the articles otherwise provide, there are 
no dissenters' rights in favor of the holders of any class of shares 
listed on a national securities exchange or held by at least two 
thousand record holders. However, the holders of such shares are 
afforded dissenters' rights if the transaction is an affiliated transac-
tion or when, upon consummation of the transaction, these share-
holders would receive something other than cash or shares of a cor-
poration which are also listed on a national exchange or held of 
record by at least two thousand shareholders. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-730(B)(a) provides that a share-
holder entitled to dissent under this article may not challenge the 
corporate action giving rise to the right unless the action is unlaw-
ful or fraudulent. This section is intended to make the dissenters' 
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right exclusive. It will succeed on this point only if the terms "un-
lawful" and "fraudulent" are narrowly construed.161 
The appraisal procedure contains six separate steps. First, as 
provided in Revised Statute section 13.1-732, if the transaction 
giving rise to the dissenters' right is to be voted on at a sharehold-
ers' meeting, notice of the meeting shall contain a statement to the 
effect that the shareholders may be entitled to assert dissenters' 
rights and shall be accompanied by a copy of Article Fifteen. If the 
transaction is concluded without shareholder action, the dissenters' 
notice described in Revised Statute section 13.1-734 must be sent 
within ten days of the effective date of the transaction. 
If the transaction in question requires shareholder approval, a 
shareholder planning to exercise his right to dissent must deliver 
written notice of his intention to the corporation before the vote is 
taken. The shareholder must not then vote the shares in favor of 
the transaction. 
Next, during the ten days following the effective date of the 
transaction, the corporation, pursuant to Revised Statute section 
13.1-734, must send notice to all shareholders who have asserted 
dissenters' rights. The notice must state, among other things, when 
and where the shareholder must send his demand for payment and 
tender his shares. This dissenters' notice must also set a date, be-
tween thirty and sixty days after delivery of the notice, as the date 
by which the shareholder must submit a payment demand. 
Within thirty days after receipt of the payment demand submit-
ted by the shareholder in reply to the dissenters' notice, the corpo-
ration shall pay the dissenter the amount it estimates to be the fair 
value of the shares, plus accrued interest. This payment is to be 
accompanied by financial statements and an explanation of how 
the corporation determined the fair value. 
If a shareholder is dissatisfied with the corporation's payment 
offer, he may notify the corporation within thirty days of his esti-
mate of the fair value and demand payment of his estimate. 
If the parties do not agree on the fair value, the corporation shall 
institute a court proceeding to determine the fair value. The court 
will award the dissenter judgment in the amount it has determined 
to be fair value. Court costs for this proceeding, including the com-
161. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of 
the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1964). 
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pensation of any appraisers appointed by the court, shall be borne 
by the corporation, except to the extent the court finds that the 
dissenter did not act in good faith. The court may also award 
counsel fees to the dissenter if it finds that the corporation did not 
comply with the procedures or may award counsel fees against ei-
ther party if it finds that the party did not act in good faith. 
0. Article Sixteen-Dissolution162 
Article Sixteen changes the terminology used in conjunction 
with, and some of the procedures for, dissolving a corporation. 
These changes were made to conform to the Model Act scheme; 
however, there are not many substantive changes from the Old 
Statute.163 
Revised Statute section 13.1-742 addresses dissolution by volun-
tary action of the directors and shareholders. This section is 
drafted consistent with those provisions governing board and 
shareholder approval of amendments to the articles, mergers or 
share exchanges, and sales of assets other than in the ordinary 
course of business. The Official Comment to Model Act section 
14.02 notes that only shares having general voting rights have the 
right to vote on a dissolution.164 
After the dissolution is authorized, the corporation files, pursu-
ant to Revised Statute section 13.1-743, articles of dissolution with 
the Commission. The Commission in turn issues a certificate plac-
ing the corporation "in dissolution." 
In essence, these procedures differ from the Old Statute only in 
terminology. Under Old Statute section 13.1-82, after approval of 
dissolution by the shareholders, the corporation submitted to the 
Commission a statement of intent to dissolve. Once the Commis-
sion filed· this statement, the same status was achieved as now oc-
curs under the Revised Statute when the Commission issues the 
certificate of dissolution. However, a certificate issued under the 
Revised Statute does not terminate corporate existence as did the 
certificate of dissolution issued under the Old Statute. 
162. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-742 to -756. 
163. See generally Gusky, Dissolution, Forfeiture, and Liquidation of Virginia Corpora-
tions, 12 U. RrcH. L. REv. 333 (1978). 
164. Other shares do not vote on a dissolution, on the theory that the rights of other 
shares are fixed in the articles. Dissolution does not change these fixed rights, but merely 
triggers some of them, such as a liquidation preference. 
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Revised Statute section 13.1-745 states the consequence of being 
"in dissolution." A corporation in dissolution exists for the limited 
purpose of winding-up and liquidating its business and affairs. The 
corporation may not carry on any business other than that appro-
priate to this limited purpose. It may collect its assets, discharge 
and provide for its liabilities, and distribute remaining assets to its 
shareholders. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-747 addresses the grounds for judi-
cial dissolution at the request of a shareholder or creditor. Any 
shareholder may institute a proceeding requesting dissolution on 
the same grounds as previously stated in Old Statute section 13.1-
94. The provision relating to dissolution for fraudulent or oppres-
sive conduct remains substantively the same as in the Old 
Statute.1611 
The "dissolution for deadlock" provision has been broadened, 
however. Revised Statute section 13.1-747(A)(1) provides that a 
shareholder can request dissolution if there is a management dead-
lock and "irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or be-
ing suffered, or the business and affairs of the corporation can no 
longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders gener-
ally."166 In addition, a shareholder deadlock, resulting in the in-
ability to elect directors at two successive annual meetings, is 
grounds for the proceeding without any showing of additional 
harm.Ie7 
In a judicial dissolution proceeding, the court may appoint re-
ceivers or custodians pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1-748. 
This section, unlike Old Statute section 13.1-94, allows the court to 
appoint custodians without an explicit finding that to do so is in 
the best interest of both the shareholders and creditors. The Re-
165. This provision is remedial in nature and is liberally construed to allow shareholders 
relief in addition to that provided by corporate bylaws. See Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., 216 
Va. 22, 216 S.E.2d 18 (1975); White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972). 
166. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-747(A)(1)(a). This provision is more flexible 
than its antecedent, OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-94(a)(1), which allowed dissolution 
only when "irreparable injury to the corporation [was] being suffered or [was] threatened by 
[the deadlock in management]." 
167. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-94(a)(3), had a comparable provision, but it re-
quired a showing of harm. As provided in REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-677(A), the 
terms of directors expire at the- next annual shareholders' meeting, unless the terms are 
staggered. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-677(E)/however, states that incumbent 
directors continue to serve (unless they resign) until their successors are elected. Therefore, 
the "deadlock in the election of directors" provision of REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 
13.1-747, does not mean that the corporation has been without directors for two years. 
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vised Statute broadens the custodian's power by allowing him to 
exercise all corporate powers, either through or in place of the 
board or officers, in order that he may manage the business in the 
best interest of the shareholders and creditors. 
Mter a hearing, if the court finds one of the grounds for judicial 
dissolution, it may enter a decree directing that the corporation be 
dissolved. The decree is transmitted to the Commission, which 
then enters an order of involuntary dissolution. Thereafter the 
court directs the winding-up and the distribution of assets. The 
court will advise the Commission when the corporation has been 
liquidated, at which point the Commission will issue an order ter-
minating existence.168 
Mter a corporation has paid, or made provision for, its debts and 
has distributed its remaining assets to its shareholders, it must file 
articles of termination of corporate existence with the Commission. 
Thereafter, the Commission issues a certificate of termination of 
corporate existence at which time corporate existence ceases.169 
Revised Statute section 13.1-755 carries over substantively the 
same provision as Old Statute section 13.1-101 regarding survival 
of remedies after termination of corporate existence. This section 
provides for the survival of rights or claims existing, and liabilities 
incurred, before termination. Rights or claims coming into exis-
tence after termination are not covered by this statute. 
P. Article Seventeen-Foreign Corporations170 
The major change made within Article Seventeen is the elimina-
tion of the joint and several liability of directors, officers and 
agents on certain contracts and for torts of corporations doing bus-
iness in Virginia without registration. The elimination of this harsh 
penalty is reasonable, considering the difficulty in defining what 
activities constitute "transacting business" so as to require 
registration. 
168. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-749. 
169. Id. § 13.1-750. 
170. Id. §§ 13.1-757 to -769. 
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Q. Article Eighteen-Records and Reports171 
Revised Statute section 13.1-770, which lists the categories of 
records a corporation must maintain, is more explicit than the 
comparable provision in Old Statute section 13.1-47. As stated in 
Revised Statute section 13.1-770 (A) through (D), a corporation 
must maintain a permanent record of all action by the sharehold-
ers and directors, including action by board committees and action 
by written consent. A list of the names and addresses of the share-
holders, alphabetized by class of shares, and "appropriate" ac-
counting records are also required. Revised Statute section 13.1-
770(E) requires the corporation to keep separate copies of certain 
materials, even though they may also fit within the records-reten-
tion provisions of subsections (A) through (D). These materials in-
clude the articles, bylaws and amendments currently in effect; cer-
tain board resolutions creating classes or series of shares, or fiXing 
their relative rights; minutes of shareholders' meetings and record 
of all shareholder action without a meeting for the most recent 
three years; all communications to shareholders during the most 
recent three years, including financial statements; and the corpora-
tion's most recent report to the Commission. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-771 confers upon the shareholders 
two separate inspection rights, each keyed to the category of 
records set forth in Revised Statute section 13.1-770. Shareholders 
have a virtually automatic right under Revised Statute section 
13.1-771(A) to inspect the materials listed in section 13.1-770(E) 
upon five days prior written notice. No showing of proper purpose 
is required. Because these records are either public documents or 
relate to the shareholder's status, the statute confers a very broad 
right to inspect these documents. The right to inspect includes the 
right to copy, and the corporation is authorized to charge the rea-
sonable cost of reproducing the records. 
Under Revised Statute section 13.1-771(B), a shareholder may 
inspect the other records referred to in Revised Statute section 
13.1-770(A) through (D), including the accounting records, share-
holder lists and records of board action-likewise on five days writ-
ten request. There are, however, several preconditions to the exer-
cise of this right. The individual must have been a shareholder of 
record for at least six months or own five percent of all outstanding 
171. Id. §§ 13.1-770 to -775. 
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shares; he must make his demand in good faith and for a proper 
purpose, describing with reasonable particularity both his purpose 
and the records he desires to inspect; and the records sought must 
be directly related to the stated purpose. 
The inspection rights conferred by Revised Statute section 13.1-
771 are limited to the documents specified in subsections (A) and 
(B). These two subsections do not exhaust the shareholder's in-
spection rights, however. Revised Statute section 13.1-771(E) 
states that subsections (A) and (B) do not affect a shareholder's 
right, as a litigant against the corporation, to exercise the same in-
spection rights as other litigants. Section 13.1-771(E) also acknowl-
edges the power of a court, independent of section 13.1-771, to 
compel the production of corporate documents. This latter provi-
sion preserves the shareholder's common law inspection rights. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-773 grants shareholders the right to 
institute a court action to enforce either of the inspection rights 
conferred by section 13.1-771(A) and (B). The court may assess 
costs and counsel fees against the corporation if the shareholder 
proves that the corporation refused inspection without a reasona-
ble basis for doubting the shareholder's right to inspect the de-
manded records. The shareholder bears the burden of proof; and 
the award of costs and fees against the corporation is a matter of 
court discretion. For both of these reasons, the judicial enforce-
ment provision favors the corporation. Model Act section 16.04 is 
more advantageous to the shareholder. The Model Act requires the 
corporation to pay the shareholder's costs, including counsel fees, 
unless the corporation can prove that its refusal of inspection was 
in good faith based on a reasonable doubt. 
Revised Statute section 13.1-774 requires a corporation to fur-
nish to any shareholder, upon demanding it, a set of its financial 
statements for the most recent fiscal year, including a balance 
sheet, income statement, and statement of changes in shareholder 
equity. If the financial statements are reported on by a public ac-
counting, his report must accompany them. Otherwise, the presi-
dent or officer responsible for the accounting records must provide 
an explanation of the basis of accounting used in preparing the 
statements and a description of any respects in which the state-
ments are not prepared on a basis consistent with the prior year's. 
This right to financial statements generally follows the approach 
of Old Statute section 13.1-47. The Revised Statute differs from 
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Model Act section 16.20, which requires the corporation. to furnish 
all shareholders the financial statements, and thus represents a 
compromise. Management is concerned about both the effort re-
quired to prepare and disseminate this information to shareholders 
who may not be interested in it and about the liability attendant 
to dissemination of this information if it is in any respect inaccu-
rate. Section 13.1-774 purports to alleviate these concerns by re-
quiring that the information be sent only to those shareholders re-
questing it. 
The management explanation of the accounting basis is a more 
serious concern. The statute does not give any guidance as to the 
specificity required in this explanation. Presumably, a particular-
ized description is not required. The Official Comment to Model 
Act section 16.20 acknowledges that the person furnishing this 
statement often will not be a trained accountant and that he 
should not be held to the standard of a professional. It notes, how-
ever, that the description of accounting bases should follow the 
guidelines of the accounting profession for reporting on a format 
which departs from generally accepted accounting principles.172 
While section 13.1-774 may impose some burden, particularly on 
small corporations, all shareholders ought to be able to obtain fi-
nancial information, and an understanding of the bases on which it 
was prepared, without exercising their formal inspection rights. 
Moreover, the distribution provisions of Revised Statute sections 
13.1-653 and -692 require that much of this same information be 
prepared to determine the legality of a distribution. 
R. Article Nineteen-Proceeding for Determination of 
Shareholders173 
Article Nineteen sets forth a procedure by which a corporation 
can determine the identity of its shareholders. When the board be-
lieves the corporate records no longer accurately reflect the owner-
ship of the corporation's shares, the board may commence a suit in 
equity requesting the court to determine the identity of its proper 
shareholders. After a hearing, the court shall determine the iden-
172. For example, if the entity uses the cash basis of accounting, the description of the 
statement of receipts and disbursements might state that it was prepared on the cash basis 
and that it presents the cash receipts and disbursements of the entity during the period, but 
that it does not purport to present the results of operation on the accrual basis. 
173. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-776 to -777. 
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tity of the corporation's shareholders; this determination is final. 
S. Article Twenty-Transition Proceedings174 
Finally, Article Twenty contains the transition provisions. Re-
vised Statute section 13.1-778 states that the Revised Statute ap-
plies on its effective date to all corporations and that the articles of 
all corporations, organized before or after its effective date, are 
subject to it. However, section 13.1-779 states that rights or liabili-
ties acquired or incurred before the effective date are not affected 
by the Revised Statute. 
The articles and bylaws of all Virginia corporations were struc-
tured in reliance on prior Virginia law. Care has been taken 
throughout the Revised Statute not to unduly upset these expecta-
tions. Few provisions have been changed in a way that rights con-
ferred by the Old Statute (which therefore needed no articulation 
in the articles) now exist only if specifically provided in the arti-
cles. Otherwise, amendments to the articles would be required to 
restore these rights. For example, the preemptive rights provisions 
of Revised Statute section 13.1-650 were retained in the "opt out" 
version for precisely this reason. Under Old Statute section 13.1-
23, if a corporation desired preemptive rights, it did not need a 
provision for them in the articles because it could instead rely on 
the statutory right. If the Revised Statute had followed the Model 
Act, preemptive rights would exist only if stated in the articles.1715 
An amendment to the articles would be required to restore these 
rights, and such an amendment might be difficult to accomplish. 
One instance in which this general approach was not followed 
involves the shareholders' right to demand a special meeting. 
Under the Old Statute, the holders of ten percent of the shares 
could demand a meeting. Under the Revised Statute, shareholders 
in corporations with over thirty-five shareholders have lost this 
right unless they are able to cause an amendment to be adopted 
restoring it. 176 
In some instances, enabling provisions authorized by the Old 
Statute have been preempted by the Revised Statute. For example, 
the Old Statute allowed provisions in the articles which lowered 
174. Id. §§ 13.1-778 to -800. 
175. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
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the quorum provision for shareholder meetings to one-third. The 
Revised Statute seems to sanction provisions raising, but not low-
ering, this percentage.177 A provision lowering the quorum could 
remain in the articles, but it would not be effective. The Revised 
Statute has preempted it.178 The reverse has also occurred. The 
Revised Statute allows a provision in the articles that directors can 
be removed only for cause;179 the Old Statute did not explicitly 
allow such a provision.180 
• 
The greatest areas of change effected by the Revised Statute are 
in its treatment of the consequences of certain conduct, such as the 
change in assenting to board action, and, more importantly, its to-
tally different or new treatment of certain subjects. The financial, 
standard of care, derivative suit and affiliated transactions provi-
sions are all substantive departures from, or additions to, prior 
Virginia corporate law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
It will be extremely interesting to observe the application of the 
Revised Statute in practice and its judicial amplification. The first 
step in its application requires careful cpnsideration by corporate 
managers, shareholders, counsel and others of the statute's impli-
cations for the structure of existing corporations and for the plan-
ning of corporate action. 
177. See REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-668(A). 
178. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
179. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-680(A). 
180. See supra pg. 98. 
